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DON'T TAKE HIS EYE, DON'T TAKE HIS TOOTH, AND DON'T
CAST THE FIRST STONE: LIMITING RELIGIOUS
ARGUMENTS IN CAPITAL CASES
John H. Blume and Sheri Lynn Johnson*
Professors John H. Blume and Sheri Lynn Johnson explore the occurrences of
religious imagery and argument invoked by both prosecutors and defense attorneys
in capital cases. Such invocation of religious imagery and argument by attorneys
is not surprising, considering that the jurors who hear such arguments are making
life and death decisions, and advocates, absent regulation, will resort to such
emotionally compelling arguments. Also surveying judicial responses to such
arguments in courts, Professors Blume and Johnson gauge the level of tolerance for
such arguments in specific jurisdictions. Presentingproposedrulesfor prosecutors
and defense counsel who wish to employ religious quotes, images, authority, and
the like, Professors Blume and Johnson propose that religious comments by
prosecutors should be sharply limited, while defense counsel should be given wider
latitude (though not unfettered freedom) to address religious subject matter. The
proposed rules are arrived at by considering the constraints placed upon
prosecutors (but not defense attorneys), and the rights conferred upon capital
defendants (but not the state) by the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual
punishment clause.
INTRODUCTION
Both opponents and proponents of capital punishment employ religious imagery
and authority in support of their respective positions;' in this respect, capital
punishment is no different from other hotly disputed social issues of the present and
past, such as abortion, gay rights, euthanasia, divorce, welfare, segregation, or war.
What is somewhat unusual is the regularity with which religious argument is
publicly invoked in the course of decision-making concerning the application of the
death penalty to particular cases. Thus, for example, it would be unusual to have
a public discussion that cited religious principles in determining whether Jane Roe's
* John H. Blume is a visiting professor of law at Cornell Law School and the Director
of the Cornell Death Penalty Project. Sheri Lynn Johnson is a professor of law at Cornell
Law School and co-director of the Comell Death Penalty Project. We thank Lisa Picquette,
a student in the Cornell Death Penalty Project's Capital Trial Clinic, for her excellent
research assistance.
See, e.g., H. WAYNE HOUSE & JOHN YODER, THE DEATH PENALTY DEBATE (Word
Publications, 1991).
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abortion, in particular, was constitutionally protected,2 or, to go back to a now-dead
controversy, whether Ruby Bridges, in particular, should have been allowed to
attend an otherwise all-white school.
In contrast, religious arguments in the course of particular capital sentencing
proceedings are very common. This may be in part because capital punishment
jurisprudence, unlike the jurisprudence of reproductive rights or segregation, has
itself mandated individualized decision-making.4 Public discussion of whether
religious principles or authority compel (or preclude) the imposition of the death
penalty for all police killings (or, more broadly, all killings) has been largely
mooted by the Supreme Court's determination that mandatory death penalty statutes
violate the Eighth Amendment.5 Perhaps what might otherwise be broader
arguments about the categories of cases in which capital punishment is morally and
religiously legitimate are imported into individual cases by this jurisprudence. Or
perhaps, religious emotions and authority are simply so compelling to jurors who
make life and death decisions that advocates, absent regulation, will naturally resort
to them.
The title of this Article refers to the two most common religious appeals.
Prosecutors in capital cases who wish to employ religious argument or imagery
overwhelmingly favor "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,"6 or some other
invocation of Mosaic law requiring capital punishment. Reported cases may be a
less reliable sample of what defense attorneys argue, as we will discuss later, but
both the cases and our informal discussions with defense attorneys suggest that
defense attorneys looking for a religious theme tend to read or retell the New
Testament story of the woman caught in adultery, whose would-be executioners are
told "[h]e that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone."7 Of course, if
these were the only statements advocates made, it would be much easier to
determine whether or not religious argument should be permitted, but as Part I will
survey, the popularity of these two arguments should not obscure the wide range of
religiously-based comments that have been made in various death penalty trials.
Part II will describe the judicial responses to these arguments. Despite the
number of constitutional constraints involved, or perhaps because ofthem, different
courts have made conflicting judgments about the propriety of the same arguments.
Moreover, few jurisdictions have enunciated a rule that, even within that
jurisdiction, can be applied with confidence to the next species of religious
2 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959(1973).
See Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 138 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. La. 1956).
" See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
6 Matthew 5:38 (King James).
' John 8:7 (King James).
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argument. Finally, with the exception of Pennsylvania,' even where comments are
disapproved, reversal is rare; indeed, as this Article was about to go to press, the
Ninth Circuit reversed a religious argument case for the first time.9 Consequently,
the last section of Part II reviews several doctrines used to affirm cases where the
court has determined the argument to be improper.
Parts III and IV present our proposed rules for prosecutors and defense counsel
who wish to employ religious quotes, images, authority, or the like. Prior
commentary on this subject is sparse; we found only two student notes 0 and the
forthcoming publication of a jointly-authored paper of our colleagues Stephen
Garvey and Gary Simson." Those three pieces take quite different views: one
student note looks to the prevalence of religious allusions in our language and
culture and concludes that "[a]ppeals to moral foundations, including biblical moral
foundations, should not be improper so long as the introduction of religion does not
encourage jurors to overlook the law and reach a verdict on an improper basis."' 2
Our colleagues, in contrast, examining the question from an Establishment Clause
perspective, 3 conclude that virtually all uses of religion in closing arguments, by
either prosecutors or defense lawyers, should be forbidden. We think neither of
these "sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander" approaches is correct. The
second student note is limited to consideration of prosecutors' comments and
proposes a narrow automatic reversal rule. We condemn more prosecutorial
arguments, address defense arguments, and present a more nuanced view of the
appropriate remedies for misconduct, in large part because we conclude that the
Note's proposed automatic reversal of cases on habeas corpus is not sustainable
under current law.
The two of us came to this topic from different directions: one from previously
researching an analogous subject, the uses of racial imagery in criminal trials, and
one from post-conviction and capital trial practice in a state where religious
argument is very common. These two perspectives, however, find a common voice
in our proposal, which sharply limits the use of religious comments by prosecutors,
while giving defense counsel wider latitude (though not completely unfettered
S See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630 (Pa. 1991).
9 Sandoval v. Calderon, Nos. 99-99010, 99-99013, 2000 WL 1657783 (9th Cir. Nov.
3, 2000).
'o Elizabeth A. Brooks, Note, Thou Shalt Not Quote the Bible: Determining the
Propriety of Attorney Use of Religious Philosophy and Themes in Oral Argument, 33 GA.
L. REV. 1113 (1999); Brian C. Duffy, Note, Barring Foul Blows: An Argument for a Per
Se Reversible-Error Rule for Prosecutors' Use of Religious Arguments in the Sentencing
Phase of Capital Cases, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1335 (1997).
" Stephen P. Garvey & Gary J. Simson, Knockin' on Heaven's Door: Rethinking the
Role of Religion in Death Penalty Cases, _ CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming ).
2 Brooks, supra note 10, at 1174.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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freedom) to address religious subject matter. As we will explain, these non-
reciprocal rules are compelled by consideration of the constraints the speech and
establishment clauses of the First Amendment place upon prosecutors (but not
defense attorneys), and by the rights conferred upon capital defendants (but not the
state) by the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. 4
I. WHAT LAWYERS SAY GOD SAYS
As the reader may guess, what prosecutors and defense lawyers think God has
said about capital punishment is so different that it is hard to see how they can be
talking about the same God. It is, however, clear that they all think they are talking
about the same God, a Judeo-Christian deity. None of the reported cases involves
reliance on religious authority from outside of the dominant tradition. Because
there are so many more cases involving prosecutors, and because we will ultimately
conclude that prosecutorial invocations of religious authority present more of a
threat to First and Fourteenth Amendment values, we begin with them.
A. Religious Appeals for Death Sentences
At least to those unacquainted with capital trial practice, both the frequency and
variety of religious quotations or allusions by prosecutors are surprising. In the last
fifteen years, nearly one hundred reported capital cases involved challenges to a
prosecutor's religiously oriented remarks, and the numbers are not decreasing.
Moreover, in mostjurisdictions, given the virtually uniform lack of success of these
challenges, 5 there must be many more cases in which prosecutors make such
remarks without challenge because the defense attorneys know that a challenge is
futile.
1. An Eye For an Eye and Other Retributive Commands
Most popular are quotations from Mosaic law that, at least upon facial
interpretation," appear to require the imposition of the death penalty. In eight
reported instances, the prosecutor chose the classic retributive mantra "an eye for
an eye."' 7 In another nine cases, the prosecutor quoted from Exodus 21:12, "[h]e
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
's The various reasons for the affirmances in th.sse cases are catalogued infra, in Part II.
16 But see Daniel A. Rudolph, The Misguided Reliance in American Jurisprudence on
Jewish Law to Support the Moral Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
437 (1996) (concluding that "an extreme reluctance to impose the death penalty, combined
with the array of barriers, rendered capital punishment virtually nonexistent in practice under
Jewish law").
"7 Thompson v. State, 581 So. 2d 1216, 1243 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); People v. Hill, 952
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that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put to death"'" and, in eight more
cases, quoted Genesis 9:6 for the rule that "[w]hoso sheddeth the man's blood, by
man shall his blood be shed."' 9 Similarly, six cases report a quotation from
Numbers 35:16:20 "the murderer shall [surely] be put to death.'
Discussions of the Fifth Commandment, "Thou shalt not kill, '2 2 are a bit more
complicated because the text is obviously open to more than one interpretation. In
three cases, the prosecutor simply cited the commandment as reason to condemn the
defendant,23 but in eight more, he took pains to explain why this commandment did
not preclude the use of capital punishment by the state.24 In the most personal of
these arguments, the prosecutor declared, "[s]ome of us went to Viet Nam and had
to kill for this country, and I will be damned if anybody is going to tell me that what
we did in Viet Nam or in any other war was a violation of the Fifth Commandment
P.2d 673, 692 (Cal. 1998); People v. Wash, 861 P.2d 1107, 1147 (Cal. 1993); People v.
Montiel, 855 P.2d 1277, 1309 (Cal. 1993); Hammond v. State, 452 S.E.2d 745, 753 (Ga.
1995); State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447,464 (Mo. 1993); see State v. Rouse, 451 S.E.2d 543,
562 (N.C. 1994) (paraphrasing); see also Waldrop v. Thigpen, 857 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ala.
1994).
"S State v. Williams, 510 S.E.2d 626, 642 (N.C. 1999); State v. Bond, 478 S.E.2d 163,
182 (N.C. 1996); State v. Hunt, 373 S.E.2d 400, 413 (N.C. 1988); see Ruiz v. Norris, 868
F. Supp. 1471, 1514 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (paraphrasing); People v. Arias, 913 P.2d 980, 1036
(Cal. 1996) (paraphrasing); People v. Williams, 756 P.2d 221, 255 (Cal. 1988)
(paraphrasing); People v. Mahaffey, 651 N.E.2d 1055, 1068 (Iii. 1995) (paraphrasing); see
also Waldrop, 857 F. Supp. at 931; Wash, 861 P.2d at 1148.
"9 Cape v. Francis, 741 F.2d 1287, 1301 (11 th Cir. 1984); Ruiz, 868 F. Supp. at 1514;
Carruthers v. State, 528 S.E.2d 217, 221 (Ga. 2000); Hammond, 452 S.E.2d at 753
(paraphrasing); Todd v. State, 410 S.E.2d 725, 733 (Ga. 1992); Doss v. State, 709 So. 2d
369, 399 (Miss. 1996) (paraphrasing); State v. Laws, 381 S.E.2d 609,632 (N.C. 1989); State
v. Middlebrooks, No. 01COI-9606-CR-00230, 1998 WL 13819 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 15,
1998).
20 Several other verses in this chapter repeat this language or language that is very
similar.
2 See Ruiz, 868 F. Supp. at 1514 (paraphrasing); State v. Gell, 524 S.E.2d 332, 346
(N.C. 2000) (same); State v. Fullwood, 373 S.E.2d 518, 535 (N.C. 1988) (same); Hunt, 373
S.E.2d at 413 (same); State v. Brown, 358 S.E.2d 1, 19 (N.C. 1987) (same); Commonwealth
v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 643 (Pa. 1991) (same).
22 Exodus 20:13 (King James).
23 Wash, 861 P.2d at 1144; Lucas v. Commonwealth, 840 S.W.2d 212,214 (Ky. 1992);
Laws, 381 S.E.2d at 632.
24 See Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1346 (4th Cir. 1996); Bracy v. Gramley, 81
F.3d 684,695 (7th Cir. 1996); Ruiz, 868 F. Supp. at 1514; Daniels v. State, 650 So. 2d 544,
561 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); People v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 544, 580 (Cal. 1997); People v.
Freeman, 882 P.2d 249,269 (Cal. 1994); State v. Holden, 488 S.E.2d 514, 529 (N.C. 1997);
State v. Bond, 478 S.E.2d 163, 182 (N.C. 1996); see also People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 692
(Cal. 1998) (explaining why "[v]engeance is mine sayeth the Lord" does not preclude capital
punishment).
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of the Bible."25
This exhausts the commonly cited Old Testament retribution verses, but there
are some interesting idiosyncratic choices. One slightly more creative prosecutor
quoted the language from Deuteronomy 27:24, "[c]ursed be he that smiteth his
neighbour secretly. And all the people shall say amen," and then added his own
commentary, "[i]t's time to sentence this man, a murderer, to die and let the people
of Bertie County say amen."26 Another cited Deuteronomy 13 as authority for the
proposition that false prophets must be put to death, calling the defendant a false
prophet and comparing him to Jim and Tammy Bakker.27 In two cases, the
prosecutor cited verses whose relevance, if any, is not made clear by the reporting
opinion: one quoted the Sixth Commandment, which forbids adultery,2" and one
quoted John, "[i]f one taketh another captive, then to captivity he must be taken."29
Another obviously took Marc Antony's oratory as a model when he announced, "I
could talk to you about Scripture and verse from the Old Testament that supports
capital punishment. But I'm not. 30
Although many prosecutorial arguments from Mosaic law were limited to a
single quotation,31 in others32 the prosecutor recited numerous quotations or
recounted at length the history of capital punishment in the Old Testament. In one
case, according to the court, the prosecutor interspersed copious biblical quotations
with the reading of a statute in such a way that a listener could not tell which was
which.33
2. Claiming Divine Authority
In a lesser number of cases, the prosecutor's religious comments address the
question of who has the authority to impose a death sentence. The coerciveness of
these claims varies greatly between cases. Occasionally, the claim is limitbd to an
assertion that sentencing the defendant to death is not a usurpation of God's
25 Bracy, 81 F.3d at 695.
26 Gell, 524 S.E.2d at 346.
27 See State v. Lundgren, 653 N.E.2d 304, 319 (Ohio 1995).
28 See State v. Gibbs, 436 S.E.2d 321, 360 (N.C. 1993).
29 State v. Spivey, No. 89 C.A. 172, 1997 WL 16196 (Ohio App. Dist. Jan. 13, 1997).
30 People v. Wrest, 839 P.2d 1020, 1028 (Cal. 1992).
3" In addition to, the quotations discussed above, some prosecutors gave their own
summation of the import of Old Testament law. See, e.g., State v. Tichnell, 509 A.2d 1179,
1197 (Md. 1986) (noting that the prosecutor said that the Bible is the authority for the
imposition of the death penalty).
32 See e.g., Waldrop v. Thigpen, 857 F. Supp. 872, 931 (N.D. Ala. 1994); People v.
Wash, 861 P.2d 1107, 1148 (Cal. 1993) (three and one-half transcript pages); People v.
Bradford, 929 P.2d 544, 580 (Cal. 1997); State v. Artis, 384 S.E.2d 470, 500 (N.C. 1989);
Gibson v. State, 501 P.2d 891, 900 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
" See Artis, 384 S.E.2d at 500.
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authority, and in such cases the prosecutor tends to proclaim: "Render unto Caesar
what is Caesar's."34 Somewhat more aggressive are the cases in which the
prosecutor claims that either he or the jury are acting under the authority of the
Almighty. When claiming God's authority for themselves, prosecutors have, for
example,35 stated that after the flood, God gave the "sword ofjustice" to Noah, who
represents the government, thereby giving the government the power to decide who
dies,36 or that he, the prosecutor, "is the servant of God to execute his wrath on the
wrongdoer.""' Similarly, others have described the authority of thejury in religious
terms,3" for example by referring to thejury as "the tool of the Lord,"39 or by stating
that the jurors were "bound by their duty to God" to return the proper sentence.4°
In some instances, however, prosecutors have been extremely aggressive in their
claim for divine authority. Thus, in three cases, the prosecutor cited the Bible in
arguing that because police and prosecutors are ordained by God as His
representatives, to disobey them is to resist God Himself, and that "he who resists
authority has opposed the ordinance of God... and will receive condemnations."'"
3. Comparisons to Biblical Characters
Both of the first two types of argument are quite generic; either the prosecutor
is claiming that God desires the death penalty or that He desires compliance with
the state. In the next three categories, the prosecutor attempts to focus on the
14 People v. Jackson, 920 P.2d 1254, 1299 (Cal. 1996); State v. Laws, 381 S.E.2d 609,
632 (N.C. 1989); see Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1346 (4th Cir. 1996)
(paraphrasing); Wash, 861 P.2d at 1148 (Cal. 1993) (paraphrasing); see also People v.
Davenport, 906 P.2d 1068, 1099 (Cal. 1996) (noting that the prosecutor argued it is not
God's province to decide about sentencing because He gave us free will and power to
choose); State v. Rogers, 341 S.E.2d 713, 731 (N.C. 1986) (noting that the prosecutor made
references [not specified in the opinion] to biblical passages that encourage Christians to
obey the law).
" See Berry v. State 703 So. 2d 269,281 (Miss. 1997) (noting that the prosecutor stated
that he had chosen to prosecute because he was commanded to do so by law and scripture);
State v. Ingle, 445 S.E.2d 880, 896 (N.C. 1994) (noting that the prosecutor stated he will go
back to his house and say his prayers because he will have a good conscience about what he
is doing and asks jury to act in such a way that it can do the same).
36 See Bennett, 92 F.3d at 1346.
3' Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
3 See McNair v. State 653 So. 2d 320, 339 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) ("And don't be
afraid. I submit when your time comes, Jesus, God, whoever you believe in, will tell you
you did the right thing.").
31 State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550, 559 (Tenn. 1999).
40 See Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 351 (6th Cir. 1998).
41 Peoplev. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862,883 (Cal. 1992) (paraphrasing Romans 13:1-7);see
also State v. Daniels, 446 S.E.2d 298, 320 (N.C. 1994) (referring to same passage); State
v. Moose, 313 S.E.2d 507, 519 (S.C. 1984) (same).
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particular facts of the case and derive some guidance from the Bible about those
facts. One way to do so is to compare the defendant to some despicable biblical
character. Thus, in three cases, the prosecutor analogized the defendant to Judas
Iscariot.42 Three prosecutors made a more extreme comparison, likening the
defendant to the devil himself.43 In three more cases, the prosecutor told the story
of Cain and Abel,44 and in one, the story of David and Goliath.45
A final case in this category denies that comparisons to biblical figures are
valid. After attempting to distinguish Cain, Moses, David, and Saul, none of whom
received the death penalty for their crimes, and Jesus, who did but should not have,
one prosecutor made the remarkable claim that the only killings he knew of in the
Bible were either acts of war or self-defense.46
4. Millstones for Child Murderers
In five child murder cases, the prosecutor cited a verse that appears in Luke
17:2, Mark 9:42, and Matthew 18:6: "Whosoever shall offend one of these little
ones that believe in me, it is better for him that a millstone were hanged about his
neck, and he were cast into the sea."4 Although one could certainly interpret these
New Testament passages as simply warning of the terrible moral gravity of doing
harm to children, this is not the interpretation the prosecutors take. Instead, they
use the admonition much as the Old Testament retributive verses are used: as a
command.
5. Specific Religious Experiences of the Defendant or Victims
This category of comments sometimes refers to evidence about the parties and
sometimes contains rank speculation. With respect to the defendant, several
prosecutors have deprecated the sincerity of the defendant's purported religious
42 See Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006, 1020 (11 th Cir. 1991); State v. Phillips, 940
S.W.2d 512, 519 (Mo. 1997); State v. Geddie, 478 S.E.2d 146, 160 (N.C. 1996).
"3 See Commonwealth v. Henry, 569 A.2d 929, 939 (Pa. 1990); Commonwealth v.
Whitney, 512 A.2d 1152, 1168 (Pa. 1986); State v. Cauthem, No. 02C01-9506-CC-00164,
1996 WL 688356 (Tenn. Dec. 2, 1996).
44 See People v. Jackson, 920 P.2d 1254, 1299 (Cal. 1996) (arguing that putting the mark
of Cain on the defendant in the past had been insufficient punishment to deter future
crimes); Shell v. State, 554 So. 2d 887, 899 (Miss. 1989) ("And we still hear ringing in our
voices the question of God, '[w]here is your brother?"'); State v. Alston, 461 S.E.2d 687,
710 (N.C. 1995) ("The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground.").
41 See Washington v. Gentry, 888 P.2d 1105, 1146 (Wash. 1995).
46 See Nixon v. State, 533 So. 2d 1078, 1101 (Miss. 1987).
47 State v. Sidden, 491 S.E.2d 225, 230 (N.C. 1997); State v. Holden, 488 S.E.2d 514,
529 (N.C. 1997); State v. Walls, 463 S.E.2d 738, 771 (N.C. 1995); Long v. State, 883 P.2d
167, 177 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Commonwealth v. Brown, 711 A.2d 444,493 (Pa. 1998).
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beliefs,48 and at least two have, like Torquemada,49 hypothesized that execution
might provide the only opportunity for the defendant's salvation.5" We found no
factual comments about the victim's religious beliefs but found several statements
that the defendant had deprived the victim of his opportunity to "get right with the
Lord"'" or to become all that God had planned for him.52 We also found three
remarks that would seem to have no probative value at all. In the first case, the
prosecutor "wonder[ed], as Garnett and Betty [the victims] were in their room, if
they were praying;"53 in the second, he referred to the victim's home as his
"crucifixion block;" ' and in the third, stated "Karen [the victim] is going up the
ladder now. I'm stire she's looking upward with great tears."55
6. Miscellaneous Remarks
A wide variety of remarks fall into no obvious category.56 In two cases, the
48 See United States ex rel. Abubake v. Redman, 521 F. Supp. 963, 971 (D. Del. 1981)
(arguing that the Bible does not mean anything to the defendant); Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d
189, 204 (Del. 1980) (same, but in response to religious testimony); Commonwealth v.
Cook, 676 A.2d 639, 649 (Pa. 1996) (arguing that the one part of the Bible the defendant did
not read is "[t]hou shalt not kill"); see also People v. Payton, 839 P.2d 1035, 1049 (Cal.
1992) (arguing that defendant's "newborn Christianity" is not a statutory mitigator).
41 See EDWARD PETERS, INQUISITION 306 (1988).
'o See People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 883 (Cal. 1992) ("This might be the only
opportunity to wake him up. God will destroy the body to save the soul.... Let him have
the opportunity to get his soul right."); People v. Wrest, 839 P.2d 1020, 1028 (Cal. 1992)
("I'm not going to talk about the fact of whether the death penalty could provide someone
with the opportunity to repent at the time of death or whether a long stay in prison will allow
somebody to find God or find rehabilitation.").
5' State v. Brown, 358 S.E.2d 1, 9 (N.C. 1987).
52 See Williams v. State, CR-98-1074, 2000 WL 127219, at *21 (Ala. Crim. App. Feb.
4, 2000); Eldred v. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 694, 707 (Ky. 1994) (same); State v.
Barrett, 469 S.E.2d 888, 898 (N.C. 1996) (paraphrasing Ecclesiastes, stating that there is a
time to live and a time to die, but defendant took God's place when he killed victim).
53 State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320, 332 (Mo. 1993).
14 Lawson v. Dixon, 3 F.3d 743, 755 (4th Cir. 1993).
" Cape v. Francis, 71 F.2d 1287, 1301 (1 th Cir. 1984). Perhaps this is a comment about
the victim's religious beliefs, but its relevance is not obvious.
56 See e.g., Bradford v. People, 929 P.2d 544, 580 (Cal. 1997) (offering a long history
of the Bible and including the New Testament story of Ananias and his wife, who were put
to death for lying, though not by the state); People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 1018 (Cal. 1992)
(citing unspecified biblical passages to support death penalty); Lawrence v. State, 691 So.
2d 1068, 1074 (Fla. 1997) (telling biblical story equating. sentencing task to "God's
judgment of the wicked"); Crowe v. State, 458 S.E.2d 799, 811 (Ga. 1995) ("Was it
[referring to finding a palm print] luck or was it divine intervention?"); State v. Calhoun, 511
A.2d 461, 487 (Md. 1986) ("It says in the Bible: '[d]eath cometh final, certain."'); Berry v.
State, 703 So. 2d 269,281 (Miss. 1997) (psychological problems like defendant's have been
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prosecutor commented on consciousness of guilt by citing Proverbs 28:1: "The
wicked will flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous stand bold as a lion.""7
Perhaps the most interesting of these is the argument that "Christians are a bunch
of wimps that will not enforce the laws,"sS which was combined with the curious
and unsupported factual representation that both the prosecutor and the defense
attorney are Baptists. 9 To the authors, perhaps because of their own religious
beliefs, one other remark was particularly striking: "The [B]ible supports mercy
only for the merciful." 0 Finally, in at leastfifteen cases, the reviewing court refers
to religious arguments by the prosecutor without stating what they were.6
B. Religious Appeals Against Death Sentences
Because the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars retrial after
an acquittal,62 most religious remarks by defense attorneys are unassailable on
appeal. The reported cases are comprised of the two instances in which a defense
attorney was precluded from making a religious argument: the slightly more
around since biblical times); State v. Phillips, 940'S.W.2d 512, 519 (Mo. 1997) (calling
dismemberment a "despicable, unchristian act"); State v. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206, 230
(Mo. 1997) ("1 trust you will pray about [your decision]" and life is created by God, has
value, and God will take it away.); State v. Zuniga, 357 S.E.2d 898, 911 (N.C. 1987)
(referring to victim as "a little child of God"); Commonweath v. Smith, 675 A.2d 1221, 1232
(Pa. 1995) ("The presumption of innocence is gone. It is removed. That is as final in God
as Ryan Leahy's life is. That man stands today a convicted murderer."); State v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, 560 (Utah 1988) (stating that a fifteen year prison sentence is not adequate
alternative to death penalty because Israelites had to wander forty years in the wilderness).
" Bussard v. Lockhart, 32 F.3d 322, 324 (8th Cir. 1994) (paraphrasing); State v.
Richardson, 995 S.W.2d 119, 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Proverbs 28:1).
s Todd v. State, 410 S.E.2d 725, 734 (Ga. 1991).
5 See id. In this case, the reader must consult the dissent to learn the content of the
remarks made by the prosecutor.
6o Cape v. Francis, 741 F.2d 1287, 1301 (11 th Cir. 1984); see also State v. Crago, 639
N.E.2d 801, 817 (Ohio App. 1994) (describing prosecutor as misquoting the Bible to make
a Golden Rule); State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 783 (Tenn. 1998) (citing "[w]hatever you
sow" as a justification for retribution).
61 See Boyd v. French 147 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1998); Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343
(10th Cir. 1994); Ruiz v. Norris, 868 F. Supp. 1471 (W.D. Ark. 1994); High v. Turpin, 14
F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Ga. 1998); Roberts v. State, 735 So. 2d 1244 (Ala. Crim. App.
1997); Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); Bonifay v. State, 680 So. 2d
413 (Fla. 1996); Street v. State, 636 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 1994); Greene v. State 469 S.E.2d 129
(Ga. 1996); Hill v. State, 427 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. 1993); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744
S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1988); Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824 (Miss. 1995); Debler v. State, 856
S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1993); State v. Rose, 451 S.E.2d 211 (N.C. 1994); State v. Keen, 926
S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1996).
62 See Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
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numerous cases in which the remarks of defense attorneys make their way into a
reported case because they are used as a justification for the prosecutor's religious
arguments, and cases in which either the execution or the omission of religious
arguments were the subject of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. From
these sources, plus anecdotal accounts, we have tried to discern the range of
religious arguments made by defense counsel.
1. Biblical Instances of Mercy
Most common, we think, are invocations of the story of the "woman caught in
the act of adultery," brought before Jesus.63 As the scribes and Pharisees reminded
Jesus, Mosaic law commanded that she be stoned, and they asked him "What do
you say about her?""
So when they continued asking him, he lifted up himself, and said unto
them, "[hie that is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone."
... But when they heard it, they went away, one by one, beginning with
the eldest, and Jesus was left alone with the woman standing before him.
Jesus looked up and said to her, "Woman, where are they? Has no one
condemned you?" She said, "No one Lord." And Jesus said, "Neither
do I condemn you; go and do not sin again."6
We have also found two reported instances of retelling the story of Cain and
Abel, with emphasis on the fact that after murdering his brother, Cain was punished
not by death, but by "banishing him from the soil,"" and "putting a mark on him."67
Similarly, two attorneys cited Jesus' forgiveness of those who killed him,6" one of
whom colorfully stated:
[H]e didn't say, "Send these people to the electric chair, consign them
63 See State v. Shafer, 53.1 S.E.2d 524 (S.C. 2000); State v. Patterson, 482 S.E.2d 760
(S.C. 1996); Rick Bragg, Carolina Jury Rejects Execution for Woman Who Drowned Sons,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1995, at A I (recounting use of this story by defense attorney David
Bruck in the penalty phase of Susan Smith's capital trial). In addition to these two reported
instances, word of mouth in the capital defense community is that this argument is extremely
common; one of us has used this argument as well.
John 8:5 (Revised Standard Version).
65 John 8:7-1 1 (King James).
66 State v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 544, 580 (Cal. 1997) (paraphrasing Genesis 4:14-16).
67 Id.; Commonwealth v. Daniels, 644 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1994) (same, arguing that we have
not created life and therefore do not have authority to end it).
6 Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1996); State v. Messiah, 538 So. 2d 175
(La. 1988).
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to hell." He lifted his eyes up and he said, "Father forgive them, for they
know not what they do." 9
Another defense attorney recounted a greater number of instances of mercy,
discussing Cain, Moses, King David, and Paul.7" More generally, counsel in one
case argued that the New Testament teaches mercy,7 and in another that retribution
and revenge are not part of the Bible or the law, and in a third that the jury would
have an opportunity to "condemn the sin but not condemn the sinner." '73
2. Biblical Prohibitions Against Execution
In three instances defense counsel quoted the Fifth Commandment: "Thou shalt
not kill."74 Another two argued that the Sermon on the Mount replaced "an eye for
eye." More indirectly, defense counsel in another case quoted: "Love your
neighbor as yourself."76 Defense counsel made the related argument that life and
death decisions belong to God in an additional two cases. In one, he paraphrased:
"Vengeance is mine, thus sayeth the Lord."77 In a second, he referred to the Sermon
on the Mount, quoting: "Judge not that ye be not judged."7" Rather more
coercively, yet another attorney argued, during the guilt phase of a capital
prosecution, that the death penalty is un-Christian, and that if the jurors impose it,
they will suffer after death. 9
Two defense attorneys recognized that the application of biblical passages is
less than certain and cited additional authority supporting an anti-death penalty
interpretation. In one case, defense counsel argued that "[t]he death penalty today
is condemned by most religious beliefs,"8 and went on to note that Popes John Paul
II and Paul IV, as well as other religious authorities, including the National Council
of Churches, oppose it.8 In the other, an attorney argued that the jury should not
69 Messiah, 538 So. 2d at 188.
70 See Nixon v. State, 533 So. 2d 1078, 1100 (Miss. 1988).
7 See State v. Oliver, 307 S.E.2d 304, 326 (N.C. 1983).
7 See State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320, 332 (Mo. 1993),
73 Street v. State, 636 So. 2d 1297, 1303 (Fla. 1994).
74 Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 695 (7th Cir. 1996); Daniels v. State, 650 So. 2d 544,
561 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 200 (Colo. 1990).
7' Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1346 (4th Cir. 1996); see also State v. Messiah,
538 So. 2d 175, 188 (La. 1988) ("An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth or turn the other
cheek, walk the additional mile. Which standard, which criterion shall you use?").
76 State v. Daniels, 446 S.E.2d 298, 321 (N.C. 1994).
17 State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550 (Tenn. 1999).
71 People v. Freeman, 882 P.2d 249, 287 (Cal. 1994).
79 See McNair v. State, 653 So. 2d 320 (Ala. 1992).
80 People v. Wash, 861 P.2d 1107, 1135 n.19 (Cal. 1993).
"' Seeid. at 1135.
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apply "an eye for an eye," literally because this approach leaves "the whole world
.. blind," citing Ghandi.82
3. Comments on the Defendant's Religious Beliefs
In two cases, defense counsel's religious arguments were limited to discussing
evidence of the quite different beliefs of the two defendants. In the more prosaic,
he discussed the defendant's religious conversion, 3 and in the other, discussed the
defendant's delusion that he was a "ninja of God," acting according to divine
orders.84 We found no religiously oriented comments about the victims.
4. Miscellaneous Remarks
In nine more cases, the reviewing court discusses whether religious argument
of defense counsel invited the religious argument of the prosecutor, but without
specifying what defense counsel said. 5
This is a total of twenty-nine cases, less than one-third of the reported cases
involving prosecutors' religious arguments. As we discussed earlier, however,
reporting of defense uses of religious arguments is limited to the cases where
prosecutors use defense remarks tojustify their own references to religion and the
few cases in which religious argument has been prohibited. Moreover, we note one
other indicator of the frequency with which defense counsel use such arguments.
In Stokes v. Armontrout, 6 the defendant claimed that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to offer testimony that the death penalty flouts the Bible.
Given the first prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard, such a claim
could not be made without the assertion that similar proffers and argument are so
frequently employed by defense counsel that to omit them is outside the range of
reasonable competence.8 7
Thus, the evidence of the reported cases, taking into account how few of the
arguments made by defense counsel land in published opinions, combined with our
82 People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 882 (Cal. 1992).
83 See Commonwealth v. Cook, 676 A.2d 639 (Pa. 1996).
84 Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495, 500 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).
85 See Thompson v. State, 581 So. 2d 1216 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); People v. Hill, 839
P.2d 984 (Cal. 1992); People v. Mahaffey, 651 N.E.2d 1055 (111. 1995); Doss v. State, 709
So. 2d 369 (Miss. 1996); Shell v. State, 554 So. 2d 887 (Miss. 1989); Debler v. State, 856
S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); State v Rogers, 341 S.E.2d 713 (N.C. 1986); Gibson v.
State, 501 P.2d 891 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); State v. Gentry, 888 P.2d 1105 (Wash. 1995).
86 851 F.2d 1085, 1086 (8th Cir. 1988).
817 See State v. Watson, 449 So. 2d 1321, 1324-25 (La. 1984) (holding that it is not
reversible error to exclude testimony of Catholic priest that the death penalty is an
impermissible punishment).
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own conversations with other defense lawyers, lead us to conclude that defense
counsel frequently make religious arguments against the death penalty, at least in
the South, where we practice. We are less sure, however, that we have adequately
surveyed the range of defense counsels' arguments than we are with respect to those
made by prosecutors.
II. WHAT COURTS SAY LAWYERS SAY ABOUT WHAT GOD SAYS
Onlyfour of the one hundred capital cases in which prosecutors made religious
arguments were reversed solely" upon that ground. 9 Both of the cases in which
defense counsel's religious arguments were precluded were affirmed.90 These
bottom lines, however, conceal a substantial disagreement concerning the propriety
of various specific arguments and the standard by which such arguments should be
judged; they also reflect agreement about a congery of doctrines that permit
affirmance even in the face of improper argument.
A. The Propriety of Particular Religious Arguments by Prosecutors
In each of the five categories of prosecution arguments described above, some
courts have condemned the very argument that others have deemed acceptable.
Thus, to start with our first category, "an eye for an eye" and other retributive
commands, three courts have found "an eye for an eye" proper,9 while four have
found it improper,92 and they are similarly divided about other Mosaic law
quotations."
88 See Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006, 1019-20 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (noting that the
court did not need to determine whether religious remarks were sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant a new sentencing hearing because improper jury instructions required vacating the
death sentence).
89 See Sandoval v. Calderon, Nos. 99-99010, 99-99013, 2000 WL 1657783 (9th Cir.
Nov. 3, 2000); Carruthers v. State, 528 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 2000); State v. Brown, 358 S.E.2d
1 (N.C. 1987); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630 (Pa. 1991).
90 See Daniels v. State, 650 So. 2d 544 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Patterson, 482
S.E.2d 760 (S.C. 1997).
"' See Thompson v. State, 581 So. 2d 1216 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Shum, 866
S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (not deciding whether there was error, but determining
.it was not plain error); State v. Rouse, 451 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. 1994).
92 See Waldrop v. Thigpen, 857 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ala. 1994); People v. Montiel, 855
P.2d 1277 (Cal. 1993); People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984 (Cal. 1992); Hammond v. State, 452
S.E.2d 745 (Ga. 1995).
93 Compare, e.g., State v. Williams, 510 S.E.2d 626, 642 (N.C. 1999) ("He that smiteth
a man, so that he die" is improper), with People v. Mahaffey, 651 N.E.2d 1055, 1068-69 (111.
1995) (not deciding if same quote is proper but determining that it is not plain error);
compare also State v. Holden, 488 S.E.2d 514, 529-30 (N.C. 1997) ("[t]hou shall not kill"
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In our second category, claims of divine authority, there is equally great
disagreement. The mildest variation, "[r]ender unto Caesar that which is Caesar's"
has been deemed both acceptable and unacceptable argument,94 and there is similar
disagreement about the most coercive cases, in which the prosecutor argued that to
disobey police and prosecutors is to resist God himself.95
Comparison to biblical characters arguments in our third category, also get a
mixed reception; we discern no pattern. In all three of the cases where the
prosecutor compared the defendant to Cain, the reviewing courts found the
comparison acceptable.96 Courts disagreed about the propriety of comparing the
defendant to Judas,97 and disagreed about a comparison of the defendant to the
Devil.98
The propriety of the millstones for child murderers argument is also in dispute.
In the three North Carolina cases, the courts found the millstone quote within the
prosecutor's authority, but in Oklahoma and Pennsylvania, it has been disapproved
as outside the bounds of proper argument."
Views on the appropriateness of arguments about the victim's and defendant's
particular religious experiences arejust as much of a hodgepodge. With respect to
the propriety of comments about the sincerity or significance of the defendant's
religious beliefs, reviewing courts are evenly split."° Not surprisingly, neither
is improper), with People v. Arias, 913 P.2d 980, 1036 (Cal. 1996) ("you shall not kill" is
proper).
9' See Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1346 (4th Cir. 1996) (not acceptable); People
v. Jackson, 920 P.2d 1254 (Cal. 1996) (same); State v. Laws, 381 S.E.2d 609, 632 (N.C.
1989) (acceptable).
" See People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1992) (paraphrasing Romans 13:1-7 and
disapproving); State v. Daniels, 446 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. 1994) (referring to same passage, but
approving its use); State v. Moose, 313 S.E.2d 507 (S.C. 1984) (same but disapproving use).
96 See People v. Jackson, 920 P.2d 1254 (Cal. 1996); Shell v. State, 554 So. 2d 887
(Miss. 1989); State v. Alston, 461 S.E.2d 687 (N.C. 1995).
"7 See Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (unacceptable); State v.
Phillips, 940 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (acceptable); State v. Geddie, 478 S.E.2d
146 (N.C. 1996) (acceptable).
98 See Commonwealth v. Henry, 569 A.2d 929 (Pa. 1990) (approving); Commonwealth
v. Whitney, 512 A.2d 1152 (Pa. 1986) (approving); State v. Cauthern, No. 02C0 1-9506-CC-
00 164, 1996 WL 937660 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 2,'1996) (disapproving).
9 See State v. Sidden, 491 S.E.2d 225 (N.C. 1997) (approving); State v. Holden, 488
S.E.2d 514 (N.C. 1997) (approving); State v. Walls, 463 S.E.2d 738 (N.C. 1995)
(approving); Long v. State, 883 P.2d 167 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (disapproving);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 771 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1998) (disapproving).
"o See United States ex. rel. Abubake v. Redman, 521 F. Supp. 963 (D. Del. 1981)
(disapproving argument in response to religious testimony that the Bible does not mean
anything to the defendant); Hooks v. State, 687 So. 2d 233 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)
(approving same); People v. Payton, 839 P.2d 1035, 1048 (Cal. 1992) (disapproving
argument that defendant's "new born Christianity" is not a statutory mitigator);
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reviewing court found the argument that execution would give the defendant an
opportunity to be saved to be appropriate.'0 ' On the other hand, reviewing courts
failed to condemn statements that the defendant had deprived the victim of his
opportunity to "get right with the Lord" ' 2 or to become all that God had planned
for him. 3
B. Criteria for Judging the Appropriateness of Religious Arguments by
Prosecutors
We havejust compared the content of what is approved and disapproved across
jurisdictions. Another way to compare these cases is to ask by what rule courts
determine the propriety or impropriety of arguments. Here, too, there is no
consensus.
1. Zero Tolerance (Almost?)
The most restrictive approach, the apparent disapproval of virtually all religious
argument, is followed by only two state courts, Pennsylvania and Tennessee, and
two federal circuits.
a. Pennsylvania
In 1991,, in the case of Commonwealth v. Chambers,"4 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court adopted a new rule, holding that "reliance in any manner upon the
Bible or any other religious writing in support of the imposition of a penalty of
death is reversible error per se and may subject violators to disciplinary action."'0 5
Since then the court has both affirmed this holding"° and extended it to religious
Commonwealth v. Cook, 676 A.2d 639,649 (Pa. 1996) (approving the argument that the one
part of the Bible the defendant did not read is "[tjhou shalt not kill").
0.. See People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 883 (Cal. 1992) ("This might be the only
opportunity to wake him up. God will destroy the body to save the soul.... Let him have
the opportunity to get his soul right."); People v. Wrest, 839 P.2d 1020, 1028 (Cal. 1992)
("I'm not going to talk about the fact of whether the death penalty could provide someone
with the opportunity to repent at the time of death or whether a long stay in prison will allow
somebody to find God or find rehabilitation.").
02 State v. Brown, 358 S.E.2d 1, 19 (N.C. 1987).
103 Williams v. State, CR-98-1074, 2000 WL 127219, at *19 (Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 4,
2000); Eldred v. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 694, 707 (Ky. 1994) (paraphrasing
Ecclesiastes, stating that there is a time to live and a time to die, but defendant took God's
place when he killed victim); State v. Barrett, 469 S.E.2d 888, 899 (N.C. 1996) (same).
'04 599 A.2d 630 (Pa. 1991).
'os Id at 643-44.
"06 See Commonwealth v. Brown, 711 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1998).
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remarks made by defense counsel, °7 as discussed in greater detail in Part II D.
This rule would seem to cover most, if not all, of the remarks we have
catalogued above, but two subsequent cases have demonstrated that even this
purportedly "bright-line"'0 8 rule has some limits. In Commonwealth v. Cook, °9 the
prosecutor responded to mitigation testimony regarding the defendant's
longstanding religious beliefs by arguing that the one part of the Bible the defendant
did not read was "[t]hou shalt not kill," and the court determined that these remarks
were not improper, reasoning that biblical references were not being used to support
imposition of the death penalty." 0 A second intuitive, but less easily articulated,
distinction was made in Commonwealth v. Smith, "' where the prosecutor said: "The
presumption of innocence is gone. It is removed. That is as final in God as Ryan
Leahy's life is. That man stands today a convicted murderer.""' About this
peculiar remark, the Pennsylvania court said only that "[aippellant has failed to
demonstrate how the prosecutor's tangential reference to God constitutes an
interjection of religious law for the jury's consideration."'"
b. Tennessee
Although Tennessee courts trace their broad prohibitions against religious
arguments back much further than do Pennsylvania courts,"' and they have
condemned more arguments than have Pennsylvania courts, '15 we discuss Tennessee
second because, to date, it is those prohibitions which are all bark and no bite,
having never led to a reversal. In Tennessee, all "references to biblical passages or
religious law during the course of a criminal trial are inappropriate.""' 6 This rule
appears to encompass not only quotations, but paraphrases of such quotations, and
as the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has held, comparisons to biblical
figures as well." 7 No cases have yet been decided that carve out an exception to
this rule.
'0' See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 644 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1994).
"o Brown, 711 A.2d at 458.
109 676 A.2d 639, 649 (Pa. 1996).
1o Id.
111 675 A.2d 1221, 1232 (Pa. 1996).
I2 Id. at 1232.
113 Id.
114 See State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773,784 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Cauthem, No. 02C01-
9506-CC-00164, 1996 WL 937660, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 2, 1996) (citing
Kirkendoll v. State, 281 S.W.2d 243 (Tenn. 1955)).
" See State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Richardson, 995
S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773; Cauthern, 1996 WL
937660.
116 Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d at 784.
117. See Cauthern, 1996 WL 937660, at * 16.
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c. The Fourth Circuit
Astonishing as it may seem, the Fourth Circuit, the most conservative federal
court of appeals, appears.to endorse a similarly broad proscription. In Boyd v.
French,"' it stated that "biblical quotations and references" are "undoubtedly...
improper."" 9 In Bennett v. Angelone, " ° it stated that "federal and state courts have
universally condemned such religiously charged arguments as confusing,
unnecessary, and inflammatory."'' Moreover, in Bennett, the court stated that the
state's argument that biblical lawjustifies the morality of the death penalty has "no
place in our non-ecclesiastical courts and may not be tolerated there."''
d. The Ninth Circuit
This year, the Ninth Circuit quoted the Fourth Circuit's broad-proscriptive
language with approval,123 after noting briefly three reasons for such a proscription.
Sandoval v. Calderon holds that invocations of "higher law" both violate the Eighth
Amendment's requirement of channeled discretion and impermissibly undercut the
jury's sense of responsibility for imposing the death penalty. 24 Sandoval also notes
that "the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment also requires [special
vigilance] in guarding against religious argument,"'' 25 without deciding whether such
arguments actually violate the Establishment Clause.
2. Religious Law May not Supplant State Law or Command the Death Penalty
More jurisdictions have disapproved arguments that.they view as urging that
religious law supplant state law. Thus, for example, the Georgia Supreme Court
deems "direct references that urge the teachings of a particular religion command
the imposition of a death penalty"'26 improper, but carefully qualifies that
prohibition with the observation that "we have long declined to disapprove of
passing, oratorical references to religious texts.... ."27 The exact contours of such
118 147 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1150 (1999).
"9 Id. at 328-29.
120 92 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1996).
121 Id. at 1346.
122 Id.
123 See Sandoval v. Calderon, Nos. 99-99010, 99-99013, 2000 WL 1657783 (9th Cir.
Nov. 3, 2000).
124 See id. at *7.
125 Id. at *7-8.
126 Carruthers v. State, 528 S.E.2d 217, 221 (Ga. 2000).
27 Id. at 221-22.
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rules, as well as their applications, vary.
California provides an excellent example because ofthe relatively large number
of religious argument cases its courts have considered. A prosecutor "may not...
invoke higher or other law as a consideration in the jury's sentencing
determination,"'28 and references to biblical support for capital punishment are
therefore improper.'29 On the other hand, some of the applications of this rule seem
psychologically naive. Thus, in People v. Arias,'30 the prosecutor quoted several
Old Testament retributive verses, but the court deemed his remarks proper because
he also said that the Bible can be used on both sides, which the court declared was
really an exhortation to jurors not to resort to religion in deciding the case!'
Similarly, the court found no error in People v. Davenport,' where the prosecutor
stated: "God allowed men to carry out his word. God gave us Bibles... to follow
and we as [a] society have decided that through God that what we are doing is not
wrong in a very aggravated circumstance."'3
According to the court, these remarks neither cloaked the prosecutor in a mantle
of divine authority nor instructed jurors to look to a higher authority, in part because
the prosecutor also stated that the "imposition of the death penalty was not usurping
God's authority but legitimately carrying out California law."' 34 Thus, it appears
that in California, a prosecutor may quote scripture or talk about God's plans for
mankind so long as he tells the jury that they must ultimately rely upon state law.'
A few other jurisdictions seem to have a similar rule, though less well-
articulated. In Ohio, the state supreme court has held that quoting Deuteronomy for
the proposition that false prophets should be put to death is improper, 36 as is
misquoting the Bible to create a retributive "Golden Rule.""' Similarly, in
Oklahoma, the state supreme court has stated that for the prosecutor to quote the
128 People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 883 (Cal. 1992).
129 See People v. Wash, 861 P.2d 1107, 1135 (Cal. 1993); People v. Wrest, 839 P.2d
'1020, 1028 (Cal. 1992).
30 913 P.2d 980 (Cal. 1996).
"3 See id.; see also People v. Jackson, 920 P.2d 1254, 1299 (Cal. 1996) ("Render unto
Caesar" is not an "argument for using Biblical or religious criteria ofjustice, but rather quite
the opposite.").
132 906 P.2d 1068 (Cal. 1996).
"' Id. at 1099.
134 Id.
135 But see People v. Wrest, 839 P.2d 1020, 1028 (Cal. 1992), an earlier California case
where the court stated that the negative form of the prosecutor's remarks would not alone
insulate them from a finding of impropriety, apparently an insight now forgotten. "Although
the prosecutor's comments here were strategically phrased in terms of what he was not
arguing, they embody the use of a rhetorical device-parleipsis-suggesting exactly the
opposite." Id.
136 See State v. Lundgren, 653 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio 1995).
137 State v. Crago, 639 N.E.2d 801, 817 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
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millstone-for-those-who-harm-children verse to make the sentencing task easier "by
implying God is on the side of a death sentence is an intolerable self-serving
perversion of Christian faith as well as the criminal law."' Though it is unclear
what is encompassed by this prohibition, an earlier case in which the same court
condemned recitations of Mosaic law 3 9 makes it evident that this ruling is not
merely a reflection of thejudges' view of the correct interpretation of this statement
by Jesus. The Eighth Circuit has suggested a roughly equivalent rule: only if the
prosecutor invokes the wrath of God against the defendant or suggests that the jury
apply divine law rather than state law, is his comment improper. 4
Recently the North Carolina Supreme Court, whose present rule is described in
the next section, suggested that it may be moving toward the condemnation of
retributive religious quotations. In State v. Williams, 4' where the prosecutor had
cited retributive passages from Exodus and Numbers, the court stated that while
such arguments are not so grossly improper as to require ex mero motu intervention
by the trial court, they "discourage such arguments" and "caution all counsel that
they should base their jury arguments solely upon the secular law and the facts,"
and then go on to warn that such arguments "unnecessarily risk reversal of
otherwise error-free trials.' 42
3. Claims of Divine Authorization are Prohibited
In two jurisdictions where retributive quotes are currently permissible, courts
have drawn the line at prosecutorial claims of divine inspiration or authorization."'
Thus, in North Carolina, it is still permissible to quote, for example, "[i]f he smite
him," but improper to argue that law officers are "'ordained' by God."'44 In a case
where the prosecutor called the North Carolina statute an Old Testament "statute
ofjudgment," the court refrained from condemning the argument, but commented
that it "sw[u]ng inappropriately close to . . . saying the law of this state codifies
divine law."' 45
Although Kentucky law is less well-developed, ' the Kentucky Supreme Court
138 Long v. State, 883 P.2d 167, 177 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
'39 See Gibson v. State, 501 P.2d 891 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
"" See Bussard v. Lockhart, 32 F.3d 322 (8th Cir. 1994).
141 510 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. 1999).
142 Id. at 643.
141 See State v. Gibbs, 436 S.E.2d 321 (N.C. 1993).
'44 State v. Artis, 384 S.E.2d 470, 500 (N.C. 1989).
145 id.
146 See Lucas v. Commonwealth, 840 S.W.2d 212,214-15 (Ky. 1992) (explaining only
that "[t]hou shalt not kill" did not "exceed reasonable latitude").
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has stated in dicta that it is impermissible for a prosecutor to argue that the Bible or
God requires a particular outcome. 47
4. Variations on "Wide Latitude"
Most jurisdictions have either avoided stating any rule at all for judging
religious arguments by prosecutors or else have embraced a vague generosity.
Thus, in Mississippi, 48 the courts have repeatedly stated that drawing on religious
material is permissible, applying this principle to quotations from Mosaic law,
149
comparisons to biblical figures,' and derogations of the defendant's mitigation
evidence. 5' In Missouri, attorneys are simply instructed to avoid "excessive
biblical ... [and historical] references."' 52 In Alabama, it is acceptable to allude,
"by way of illustration, to historical facts and public characters, or to principles of
divine law or biblical teachings,""' with the only apparent limitation being that the
prosecutor may not "minimize the legal significance of the jury's role" in
sentencing.5 4 In most of the remainingjurisdictions, 'courts have simply avoided
describing any rule for deciding these cases, occasionally by deeming the remark
improper without explaining the basis for doing so,'56 but more often by finding
some reason for affirmance without reaching the question of the merits of the
claimed impropriety."'
"'7 See Eldred v. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1994).
148 See Berry v. State, 703 So. 2d 269 (Miss. 1997); Doss v. State, 709 So. 2d 369 (Miss.
1996); Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824 (Miss. 1995); Shell v. State, 554 So. 2d 887 (Miss.
1989).
"I See Doss, 709 So. 2d 369.
s0 See Shell, 554 So. 2d at 887 (finding it permissible to discuss Cain and Abel).
151 See Berry, 703 So. 2d at 269.
' State v. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206, 230 (Mo. 1997) (quoting State v. Debler, 856
S.W.2d 641,656 (Mo. 1993)); State v. Phillips, 940 S.W.2d 512, 519 (Mo. 1997); State v.
Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 656 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); see also State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d
886 (Mo. 1995); State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320, 332 (Mo. 1993).
"' lvery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495, 511 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).
's4 McNair v. State, 653 So. 2d 320, 339-40 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (telling the jurors,
interestingly enough, that when they died, Jesus would tell them they had done the right
thing was not deemed a violation of this rule; apparently the court was looking at "legal
significance" in a fairly literal way).
"' But see Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating without
elaboration that it is improper to refer to religious symbols and beliefs, and employing that
rule to condemn a comparison to Judas Iscariot).
156 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Abubake v. Redman, 521 F. Supp. 963 (D. Del. 1981);
Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 198g).
' See infra Section C.
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C. Reasons for Affirmance Despite Improper Arguments by Prosecutors
As one of us observed with respect to uses of racial imagery, "[t]here is a passel
of reasons for these affirmances."' 58 In a large number of cases, the courts rely
upon defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's remarks to sustain the
death sentence. In the absence of objection, most appellate courts either deem a
claim procedurally barred'59 or require a demonstration of plain error before
entertaining a misconduct claim; where no objection has been made to a
prosecutor's religious argument, courts often skip over the question of whether any
error occurred and declare that certainly the comments did not rise to the higher
standard of plain error. 6 '
In another large group of cases, the court excuses the prosecutor's conduct by
reference to the doctrine of invited error. Courts virtually always apply this
doctrine without consideration of whether different standards apply to prosecution
and defense arguments.' 6' Perhaps this sauce-for-the-goose reflex is not surprising,
but other aspects of the application of this doctrine cannot be so easily rationalized.
Surely, it is odd that in three cases courts have applied this doctrine when defense
counsel never in fact referred to the Bible, but the court thinks that the prosecutor
"reasonably anticipated" that he would!'62
Almost as surprising are the two cases in which defense counsel's subsequent
responses to the state's religious arguments are deemed adequate to justify the
state's foray into religious material.'63 Finally, in two of the cases where the
158 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TULANE L. REV. 1739,
1782 (1993).
159 See, e.g., People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1998); State v. Tichnell, 509 A.2d 1179
(Md. 1986); Berry v. State, 703 So. 2d 269 (Miss. 1997); Doss v. State, 709 So. 2d 369
(Miss. 1996); Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824 (Miss. 1995); Watts v. State, 487 P.2d 981
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
160 See, e.g., Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); Bonifay v. State, 680
So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1996); Street v. State, 636 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 1994); People v. Mahaffey,
651 N.E.2d 1055 (Il. 1995); State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 464 (Mo. 1993); State v.
Laws, 381 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1989); State v. Fullwood, 373 S.E.2d 518 (N.C. 1988); State
v. Hunt, 373 S.E.2d 400 (N.C. 1988); State v. Brown, 358 S.E.2d I (N.C. 1987); State v.
Zuniga, 357 S.E.2d 898 (N.C. 1987); State v. Oliver, 307 S.E.2d 304 (N.C. 1983); see also
Todd v. State, 410 S.E.2d 725 (Ga. 1991); State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tenn.
1994) (holding that defendant waived the issue by not objecting, but because the case was
capital, the court considered the issue, albeit-under the higher standard of whether the remark
"clearly would have had some effect on the verdict").
.6 See Daniels v. State, 650 So. 2d 544 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); McNair v. State, 653 So.
2d 320 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); People v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 544 (Cal. 1997).
62 See State v. Holden, 488 S.E.2d 514,530 (N.C. 1997); State v. Bond, 478 S.E.2d 163,
182 (N.C. 1996); State v. Barrett, 469 S.E.2d 888, 899 (N.C. 1996).
63 See Shell v. State, 554 So. 2d 887 (Miss. 1989); State v. Daniels, 446 S.E.2d 298
(N.C. 1994).
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purported invitation did precede the complained of conduct, the connection between
the two was quite tenuous: in one case the court deemed the prosecutor's comment,
"[t]he Bible says if you kill somebody you must be put to death,"' " a legitimate
effort to counter defense testimony about the defendant's religious activities;165 and
in the other, the reviewing court determined that the prosecutor's comment,
"wondering" whether the victims were praying before being murdered, was
responsive to defense counsel's statement that retribution and revenge are not part
of the Bible. 
66
In another large subset of cases, the reviewing court affirmed because it
concluded that the error was harmless. Most frequently, these determinations cited
in conclusory fashion the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the heinousness of
the crime, in finding no prejudice. 67 Although it is standard doctrine to consider
whether an instruction cured an alleged error, in two cases the courts relied in part
upon a judge's instruction to defuse religious comments despite the fact that the
relevant instruction was only the general statement that arguments by counsel are
not evidence. 6 In one case, the reviewing court relied upon its own power to
independently assess the sentence as a purported cure for any possible effect on the
jury's sentencing decision. 69 In three cases, the reviewing courts relied in part on
the brevity of the remarks in finding no prejudice, 7 and in six cases, the courts
gave no real reason for their conclusion that the remarks were not prejudicial.' 7 '
Thus, although about a third of prosecutors' religious remarks have been
disapproved, only four have compelled reversal.' Two of these reversals have
Crowe v. State, 458 S.E.2d 799, 811 (Ga. 1995).
165 See id.
'6 See State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. 1993).
67 See Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1998); Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336
(4th Cir. 1996); Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel.
Abubake v. Redman, 521 F. Supp. 963 (D. Del. 1981); People v. Wrest, 839 P.2d 1020 (Cal.
1992); Long v. State, 883 P.2d 167 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); Gibson v. State, 501 P.2d 891
(Okla. Crim. App. 1972); State v. Richardson, 995 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
168 See People v. Mahaffey, 651 N.E.2d 1055 (III. 1995); Boyd, 147 F.3d 319.
169 See State v. Lundgren, 653 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio 1995).
170 See Waldrop v. Thigpen, 857 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ala. 1994); United States ex rel.
Abubake v. Redman, 521 F. Supp. 963 (D. Del. 1981); People v. Wash, 861 P.2d 1107 (Cal.
1993).
"' See Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 1996); Hammond v. State, 452 S.E.2d
745 (Ga. 1995); State v. Laws, 381 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1989); State v. Cauthem, 967 S.W.2d
726 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Gentry, 888 P.2d
1105 (Wash. 1995).
17 See Sandoval v. Calderon, Nos. 99-99010, 99-99013, 2000 WL 1657783 (9th Cir.
Nov. 3, 2000); Carruthers v. State, 528 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 2000); State v. Brown, 358 S.E.2d
I (N.C. 1987); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630 (Pa. 1991).
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occurred in Pennsylvania, where the court has imposed an automatic reversal rule. "
In the third, the Georgia Supreme Court declared without elaboration that it could
not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the biblical quotations were
harmless. 74 Most recently, the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief based upon its
assessment that the defendant was prejudiced by the prosector's religious argument;
in finding prejudice, that court relied upon the extent and coerciveness of the
comments, the absence of overwhelming evidence, and the length of jury
deliberations. "
Two jurisdictions may be considering more stringent enforcement. In
Tennessee, the Court of Criminal Appeals has recently stated that "[a]t some point,
the need to preserve the integrity of the judicial process will require that the
continued practice not be subject to the harmless error rule."'76 In Oklahoma, the
Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed its displeasure with religious arguments
in strong terms, stating with respect to the "millstone for child murderers" quotation
that "[t]his statement is rank misconduct which we expect not to be repeated."' 77
D. The Limited Judicial Response to Defense Counsel's Religious Arguments
In large part, courts have said nothing about what arguments defense counsel
may make; only four cases confront this issue directly. As mentioned earlier,
Pennsylvania has held that the ban on religious argument extends to defense
counsel. In Commonwealth v. Daniels,7 ' the state supreme court held that
"commenting on religion is . . . improper when it goes beyond the bounds of
consideration of the character and the record of the accused."'79 The court deemed
religious arguments outside this limited sphere as improper for the same reason that
it is improper for prosecutors: it distractsjurors from consideration of the evidence
concerning the appropriateness of the death penalty in the circumstances of that
case. In addition, the court stated that because the legislature has authorized the
death penalty, it would not permit an attack on the legislative enactment of the death
penalty. Given that "the law, under certain circumstances, mandates death,"'80
defense counsel should be precluded from arguing that the death penalty is morally
wrong.
In dicta, the Supreme Court of California has taken a slightly more moderate
' See Chambers, 599 A.2d at 630.
See Carruthers, 528 S.E.2d 217.
"7 See Calderon, 2000 WL 1657783, at * 12.
176 State v. Richardson, 995 S.W.2d 119, 128 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
Long v. State, 883 P.2d 167 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
178 644 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1992).
171 Id at 1183.
180 Id.
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position, as it has with respect to the arguments of prosecutors.' In People v.
Sandoval,'82 the case in which the Ninth Circuit eventually granted habeas relief,
the California Supreme Court concluded that "[r]eference by either party to
religious doctrine, commandments or biblical passages"'8 3 is improper. Although
it acknowledged that the defendant must be allowed latitude in the presentation of
mitigating evidence, it denied that such latitude extends to "exhortation of religious
canons as a factor weighing against the death penalty."'84 It departed from the
Pennsylvania court's approach, however, by stating that they "[did] not mean to rule
out all reference to religion or religious figures so long as the reference does not
purport to be a religious law or commandment."'8
.The only other jurisdiction that has directly addressed religious arguments by
the defense is South Carolina. In South Carolina, the South Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that the trial judge did not err in prohibiting the defense attorney from
telling the story of the woman caught in adultery during his closing argument.'86
The court gave no reason for this conclusion but somewhat cryptically added:
"Furthermore, appellant's argument in this case resulted in no fundamental
unfairness since the trial judge permitted neither the solicitor nor appellant to argue
about religion or God."'8 7 Recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed
this rule in State v. Shafer.' We would guess that this implies a "sauce-for-the-
goose" rulefor each case; trial judges may allow or disallow religious argument as
they please, so long as they do so evenhandedly.
III. WHAT COURTS SHOULD SAY
Given the hodge-podge of outcomes and rationales that courts have employed
when confronted with prosecutors' religious arguments, and the dearth of cases
ruling on defense counsels' religious arguments, it is impossible to describe any test
as commanding even majority support. We think that part of the reason for the
scattered case law regarding prosecutorial argument is that no court has
systematically considered all of the constitutional and statutory limits on such
arguments. 9 Instead courts have tended to grab the first one that comes to mind,
18 See People v. Wash, 861 P.2d 1107 (Cal. 1993); People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862
(Cal. 1992).
,82 841 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1992).
183 Id at 883.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 884.
16 See State v. Patterson, 482 S.E.2d 760 (S.C. 1997).
I87 d at 766.
188 531 S.E.2d 524, 532 (S.C. 2000).
189 The notable exception to this generalization is Justice Mosk's dissent in People v.
Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1992). Justice Mosk wrote (without amplification) that
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or perhaps the only one that the litigants briefed. We also think that the "sauce-for-
the-goose" approach that the three courts addressing defense arguments seemed to
agree upon is wrong; we believe it is the result of a related failure: the failure to
consider systematically whether the various constraints that apply to prosecutors
also apply to defense attorneys, and how these constraints interact with rights
unique to the defendant. We hope to remedy these failures in the following section.
A. Constitutional and Statutory Limitations on Prosecutors' Religious
Arguments
Although the Fourth Circuit's characterization of"religiously-based arguments"
as "universally condemned"' 9" certainly overstates the relevant positive law, we
think it is close to the mark, normatively speaking. Most religious arguments made
by prosecutors are improper and should be precluded because they infringe upon
one or more constitutional rights. The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment,.the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment each forbid at least some of the arguments discussed above.
It is not our intention to discuss exhaustively the reach of each of these clauses, but
only to sketch them in sufficient detail to convince the reader that together they
prohibit all religious arguments, except those that directly address testimony
concerning the defendant's or victim's religious beliefs or activities, assuming, of
course, that such testimony was properly received as relevant to aggravation or
mitigation.
1. Establishment Clause Limitations
Because the Establishment Clause sweeps so broadly, we begin with it. A
prosecutor is a "quintessential state actor,"'' so there can be no doubt that the
actions of the prosecutor are subject to the Establishment Clause. The proper
standard forjudging Establishment Clause violations is less than clear. The classic
three-prong purpose-effect-entanglement test of Lemon v. Kurtzman'92 has never
been formallyabandoned, but it has been frequently criticized by various members
religious arguments violated the Establishment, Due Process, 'and Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clauses of both the United States and California constitutions. See id. We
expand upon those arguments here, and also consider Free Speech Clause limitations.
'90 Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319, 329 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Bennett v. Angelone, 92
F.3d 1336, 1346 (4th Cir. 1996)).
'9 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50 (1992); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
350 (1987).
'92 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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of the Court93 and frequently sidestepped.'94 Nevertheless, a majority of the Court
remains committed to the central tenet of Lemon: government may not take action
either for the purpose, or with the primary effect, of endorsing religion.'95 Although
religious arguments pass the purpose test, they fail the primary effect test.
Even the most zealous advocate of Lemon would not contend that religious
arguments in capital cases fail the purpose prong; 96 whatever his secondary
motives, the overriding purpose behind the prosecutor's reference to religion in his
sentencing phase closing argument is the desire to secure a death sentence.' 97 The
effect prong of the test, however, focuses not on the subjective intent of the
governmental actor, but upon the likely effects on a reasonable observer. The
question, therefore, becomes whether the juror or courtroom spectator is likely to
view the reference to religion as sending a message of state approval (or
disapproval, which occurs less frequently in this context) of religion.'
A state may not place its power or prestige behind religion, whether it be a
particular form of religion, or religion in general. When it attempts to do so, it
effectively endorses religion.' 99 When a prosecutor refers to religion in closing
argument, he obviously places the power and prestige of his office behind his
remarks. Indeed, prosecutors frequently refer to their submissions as those of the
state; the prosecutor does not claim in his or her request to be seeking death as
"William Smith" or "Susan Jones," but as "we, the people of the state of South
Carolina." The only question, therefore, is which kinds of references to religion,
in fact, lend religion power or prestige.
As the Ninth Circuit has suggested-but not decided-the answer would seem
193 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reviewing
opinions criticizing the Lemon test).
'9 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, _ U.S.__, 120 S. Ct. 2530(2000) (finding federally
aided assistance to parochial schools does not violate the Establishment Clause); Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (holding that a program allowing public school teachers to
teach remedial education to disadvantaged children did not violate the Establishment
Clause); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing that a city did not violate the
Establishment Clause by using a nativity scene in its Christmas display).
"' See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995)
(holding that the state did not violate the Establishment Clause by permitting private party
to display a cross on grounds of state capitol). Four members of the Court, however, would
find no Establishment Clause violation absent the presence of coercion. See, e.g., id at 763-
69 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J.).
196 See Garvey & Simson, supra note 11.
117 Only when the "pre-eminent purpose" of a state action is "plainly religious in nature"
is the purpose prong satisfied. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
198 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1989); see also Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the interpretation of state
endorsement of prayer in schools).
'99 See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
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to be that virtually all of them do. Looking at our initial categories, it is obvious
that quoting "an for an eye" or any other retributive command lends power and
prestige to religion because it urges the jury to rely upon religion in determining
sentence; quoting "millstones for those who harm children" functions in the same
way.
Claims of divine authority for the prosecutor or police at first glance may not
seem to fit the endorsement criteria because it appears that the prosecutor is
borrowing God's prestige and power, rather than loaning some to God.
Nonetheless, if we consider the ultimate effect on the audience, it is to enhance and
endorse religion; why else should the prosecutor want God's authority unless he or
she is acknowledging the ultimate authority of God? Certainly, the identification
of the state with God in the stronger versions of this claim (i.e., to resist the state is
to resist God) constitutes such an identification of God with the state that
endorsement is inevitable; even the weakest versions of claims of divine authority
(e.g., "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's") °  suggest that the state bows to
God, and that it is only because God has given the state this power that it may
exercise it. This too is endorsement.
Comparisons to biblical characters vary greatly, and vary as well in the degree
to which their primary effect upon an observer is to advance religion. It is hard to
imagine an observer hearing a comparison to Judas without inferring endorsement
of Christian beliefs. Similarly, one would expect that a retelling of the story of Cain
and Abel ending in the quotation "[t]he voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me
from the ground" '' suggests to the listener that the Bible provides guidance on how
to deal with the defendant. The only marginal case in this category is that of the
prosecutor who tried to distinguish Cain, Moses, David, and Saul, none of whom
received the death penalty for their actions; even the process of contrast, however,
suggests that were a biblical comparison valid, it would provide guidance for the
present situation.
On the other hand, comments about the specific religious experiences of the
defendant or victim might, but would not always, constitute endorsement. It seems
to us that comments without evidentiary support virtually always would have the
effect of advancing religion; hypothesizing that the victim was praying prior to his
death or that execution might provide the defendant with an opportunity for
salvation implies endorsement of religious practices and beliefs, because there
would be no reason for a prosecutor to fabricate such things unless he or she
believed them and, more importantly, believed the jury should consider them in
assessing the appropriate sentence. On the other hand, were there evidence that the
victim was praying at the time he was killed, this would legitimately bear on
whether he posed any threat to the defendant, which is relevant to the moral
200 See cases cited supra note 34.
20 State v. Alston, 461 S.E.2d 687, 710 (N.C. 1995).
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turpitude of the offense. Similarly, if the defendant presented evidence of good
character that included religiosity, a prosecutor could question the credibility of that
evidence in the same way that he would challenge the credibility of other evidence
of good character, and not thereby either endorse or disparage the belief itself.
With respect to our miscellaneous category, ' generalizations are obviously
difficult. Undeterred, we venture two. First, the mere use of the word "God" is
unlikely to constitute an endorsement of religion; thus to call a victim "this little
child of God" or to say "my God!" is probably insufficiently specific to have a
substantial effect of advancing or endorsing religion. On the other hand, virtually
all identifiable quotations from the Bible do have an endorsing effect, for they
suggest the authority of that book compared to others. Thus, even if"[t]he wicked
will flee when no man pursueth"20 2 does not suggest a rule or analogy by which to
decide an entire case, it suggests that the Bible is the source to turn to in resolving
difficult questions. It is not accidental that some other equally "poetic" source such
as Eldridge Cleaver is not quoted, for it is the identification with and endorsement
of the religious authority that is both desired and anticipated.
2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause Limitations
"Death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed
in this country.... both [in] its severity and its finality."2 3 As a consequence, the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause requires a "greater
degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination, 20 4 which has a number
of ramifications, 205 two of which are relevant here.
a. The "Truly Awesome Responsibility of Capital Jurors"
In Caldwell v. Mississippi,2" the Supreme Court held that it is "constitutionally
impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who
has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness
202 See cases cited supra note 57.
203 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 357-58 (1977)).
204 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1986) (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S.
992, 998-99 (1983)).
205 See, e.g., id (finding the special nature of capital sentencing proceeding requires voir
dire on racial prejudice not required for non-capital cases); Beck, 447 U.S. at 625 (holding
that a capital defendant's jury must be permitted to consider verdict of guilt of lesser
included non-capital offense supported by the evidence although due process does not
require that a non-capital defendant is not entitled to lesser included offense instruction).
206 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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of the defendant's death rests elsewhere."20 7 Prosecutorial references to religion
during closing argument diminish the jury's sense of responsibility when they
suggest that the decision is dictated by the Bible or God. A number of courts,
including the Ninth Circuit,2"' have found a prosecutor's references to religion in
closing argument to violate the Caldwell rule, though they disagree on what sort of
remarks Caldwell covers.209
Certainly, remarks that state or imply that capital punishment has been
sanctioned by the Bible or by God (including all of the retributive quotes and the
"millstones for those who harm children" verses) would fall within this rule, as
would assertions that God has ordained the prosecutor (who, of course, is seeking
a death sentence). On the other hand, in most cases, 2 0 neither comparisons to
biblical characters nor comments about the defendant's or victim's religious
experiences would diminish the jurors' sense of responsibility.
b. "Consideration of the Character and Record of the Individual Offender"
The other "death is different" requirement that has implications for prosecutors'
religious arguments is the "rejection of the common-law practice of inexorably
207 Id. at 328-29 (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)).
20 See Sandoval v. Calderon, Nos. 99-99010, 99-99013, 2000 WL 1657783 (9th Cir.
Nov. 3, 2000).
209 See, e.g., Buttrum v. Black, 721 F.Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (reversing because,
among other instances of misconduct, the prosecutor made improper biblical reference,
stating "[hie is the servant of God to execute his wrath on the wrongdoer"); People v. Hill,
952 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1998) (reversing because, among other instances of misconduct, the
prosecutor made improper reference to "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" during closing
argument); People v. Wash, 861 P.2d 1107 (Cal. 1993) (holding improper the prosecutor's
numerous references to religion, including "[r]ender unto Ceasar [sic] the things that are
Ceasar's [sic]," his citation to the commandment "thou shalt not kill," and his suggestion that
the commandments were delivered because "God recognized there'd be people like Mr.
Wash"); Carruthers v. State, 528 S.E.2d 217, 221 (Ga. 2000) (reversing because of
prosecutor's improper biblical references during closing argument arguing that the Bible
supports capital punishment as deterrence, including "[w]ho sheddeth man's blood by man
shall his blood be shed for in the image of God made [he] man," "[a]ll they who take the
sword shall die by the sword," and a claim that Paul's Letter to the Romans says that every
person is subject to the governing authority). But see McNair v. State, 653 So. 2d 320 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1992) (holding that telling the jurors that when they died, Jesus would tell them
they had done the right thing was deemed not a violation of this rule). Apparently the court
was looking at "legal significance" in a fairly literal way.
210 One exception in the biblical characters category would be comparisons to Cain and
Abel when coupled with quotations that imply retribution is required, such as the prosecutor
made in State v. Alston, 461 S.E.2d 687, 710 (N.C. 1995): "The voice of thy brother's blood
crieth unto me from the ground. '"
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imposing a death sentence upon every person convicted of a specified offense."21 '
In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court struck down North Carolina's
broad mandatory scheme for its failure to allow for "particularized consideration
... of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition
upon him of a sentence of death." '212 Moreover, the Court deemed even Louisiana's
narrow mandatory statute impermissible because evolving standards of decency
reject "the belief that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical
punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender." '13
Thus, all state capital sentencing laws require individualized consideration of the
offender and his offense because the Eighth Amendment forbids any other kind of
capital sentencing scheme. But, as the Ninth Circuit succinctly noted, "The Biblical
concepts of vengeance ... do not recognize such a refined approach."2 4
Were jurors to rely upon any of the retributive verses from Mosaic law, all of
which are nondiscretionary in nature, they would be violating their duty under
(constitutionally-mandated) state law. As the Georgia Supreme Court correctly
observed, for a prosecutor to quote Mosaic law is to suggest that "another, higher
law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's
instructions." ' 5 Summaries of Old Testament law are similarly infirm, as is the use
made of the "millstones for those who harm children" quote. Other forms of
religious argument or imagery, however, do not violate the Woodson individualized
sentencing principle.
3. Due Process Clause Limitations
An additional danger posed by many religious and biblical references during
closing argument are their prejudicial and inflammatory effect on the jury.2 16 The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels reversal of a conviction
211 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976).
21 Id at 303.
213 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325,333 (1976) (internal quotations omitted); see also
Summer v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
214 Sandoval v. Calderon, Nos. 99-99010, 99-99013, 2000 WL 1657783, at *9 (9th Cir.
Nov. 3, 2000).
211 Carruthers v. State, 528 S.E.2d 217, 221 (Ga. 2000); see also State v. Artis, 384
S.E.2d 470, 501 (N.C. 1989) (expressing disapproval of prosecutor's amalgam of Mosaic
Law and statutory references, on the basis that "[s]uch remarks are not only misguided, they
are misleading").
26 See Hammond v. State, 452 S.E.2d 745, 753 (Ga. 1995) (holding the following
remarks inflammatory and improper: "He violated the law of God. Thou shalt not kill.
Whoever sheds the blood of man by man shall his blood be shed, for God created man in his
own image. An eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth. A life for a life."); see also United States
v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 133 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding a reference to Peter's denial of Christ
improper and inflammatory).
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when the prosecutor's comments "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make
the resulting conviction a denial of due process. '  This is a high standard, and
unlike those previously considered, takes into account whether the objectionable
comment was invited by defense counsel, at least to the extent that the defense
counsel's comments limited the damage done by the prosecutor's remarks." 8
Interestingly enough, although there is overlap between this category and the
Establishment Clause violation category, most cases that meet this standard do not
violate Eighth Amendment restrictions. Thus, for example, the Eleventh Circuit
found that a comparison of the defendant to Judas Iscariot violated due process
because of its inflammatory nature," 9 though such a comparison would not seem
either to diminishjuror responsibility or preclude individualized decision-making.2
It should be noted that some religious arguments that do not violate due process
nonetheless violate complementary statutory22' or supervisory 2 rules concerning
the conduct of trials, or ethical duties placed upon prosecutors. 23 Moreover, in
some respects, biblical arguments risk another harm related to unfairness caused by
passion; they may cause the jury to digress from its individualized judgment
mission into questions concerning the proper interpretation of biblical texts. As
even the permissive North Carolina Supreme Court noted, closing arguments based
on religion "inevitably pose a danger of distracting the jury from its sole and
exclusive duty of applying secular law."224
217 Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 169 (1986).
218 See id. at 179.
29 See Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006 (11 th Cir. 1991).
220 Upon reflection, we think this is because prosecutors tend to use religion in capital
sentencing in proceedings in one of two ways: either to tell the jury what to do, or to make
them mad. While both of these uses violate the Establishment Clause, the first violates
Eighth Amendment requirements and the second violates due process requirements.
22 For an unusually specific example, see LA. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 770 (West
1981) (requiring a mistrial on motion of the defendant when a state official has referred
directly or indirectly to race, religion, or national origin, and the comment was not material
and might prejudice the jury against the defendant).
222 See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (distinguishing habeas review
of summations from "the broad exercise of supervisory power").
223 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-5.8(c) (1971) ("The prosecutor should not use
arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury.").
224 State v. Williams, 510 S.E.2d 626, 642-43 (N.C. 1999) (expressing disapproval of
prosecutor's references to religion in closing argument, including "[h]e that smiteth a man,
so that he die, shall be surely put to death." and comparing the statute under which the state
was urging the death penalty with the Bible, the "statute of judgment").
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4. Freedom of Speech Clause Limitations
We consider Free Speech Clause limitations last because they affect the
smallest number of cases. In a capital sentencing proceeding, a state may neither
"authorize a jury to draw adverse inferences from conduct that is constitutionally
protected," '225 nor treat as aggravating "factors that are constitutionally
impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as... the race,
religion or political affiliation of the defendant." '226 In Dawson v. Delaware,227 the
Supreme Court held that evidence concerning the defendant's beliefs may be
properly admitted in only three situations: (1) the evidence is tied to the murder of
the victim; (2) the evidence is used to show that a defendant represents a future
danger to society; or (3) the evidence may be relevant to rebut any mitigating
evidence offered by the defendant.22 Presumably, arguments concerning the
defendant's beliefs or associations violate the First Amendment just as does
admission of evidence, absent one of these three circumstances.
Thus, if a prosecutor wished to comment upon the defendant's religious beliefs,
he ordinarily could not do so unless the defendant had opened the door with the
evidence he offered in mitigation. Given, however, the relative paucity of
comments about the defendants' religious beliefs, this barrier is either scrupulously
honored or irrelevant to the arguments most commonly made. It does have a few
important applications where the defendant may belong to an unpopular religious
group such as the Black Muslims.
B. An Amalgam Rule and Its Enforcement
Surprisingly, taking all of these constitutional constraints together simplifies,
rather than complicates, the question of defining and regulating religious argument
by prosecutors.
225 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
226 Id. at 885. Although the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission
of a defendant's political beliefs or racial attitudes during sentencing, see Dawson v.
Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 165 (1991), the government may not admit such beliefs
indiscriminately. In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983), the Supreme Court held that
a sentencing judge in a capital case properly considered the defendant's membership in the
Black Liberation Army and his consequent desire to start a racial war, where racial hatred
motivated the killing and the defendant's "desire to start a race war [was] relevant to several
statutory aggravating factors." Id. at 949. In contrast, the Supreme Court found evidence of
the defendant's membership in a racist prison gang, the Aryan Brotherhood, inadmissible
where, on the facts of the case, that affiliation had "no relevance to the issues being decided
in the proceeding." Dawson, 503 U.S. at 160.
22 503 U.S. 159 (1991).
228 See id
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1. Defining Religious Argument
The careful reader will have noticed that we have not yet defined religious
argument, and this delay has been deliberate. If we superimpose the constitutional
constraints on the categories of prosecutorial arguments that we created by
attempting to sort the cases (ignoring the miscellaneous category for the moment),
it turns out that the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, taken together,
proscribe quotation of or reference to retributive Mosaic law, claims of divine
authority and quotations of the millstone verse (all of which are forbidden by
Establishment Clause and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause), comparisons
to biblical characters and speculative comments on the victim's or defendant's
religious experiences (both of which are forbidden by the Establishment Clause and
often the Due Process Clause as well), and derogatory references to the content of
the defendant's religious beliefs except where they provided a motivation for the
crime (which the Freedom of Speech Clause forbids). This leaves only one
significant category that we initially reviewed: comments about the sincerity or
significance of a defendant's or victim's actual religious experiences. This
category forms the only exception to our tentative, definition: religious argument is
any recognizable quotation from, paraphrase of, or allusion to the Bible or biblical
characters, including God, or to any other religious text, characters, or deity, except
in those instances where (1) the allusion is limited to the discussion of evidence
presented at trial concerning the specific religious beliefs or activities of the
defendant(s) or victim(s), and (2) such beliefs or activities are relevant to mitigation
or aggravation.
2. Enforcing the Prohibition Against Religious Argument by Prosecutors in
Capital Cases
Here is the real rub. Even the conservative Fourth Circuit might nod at our
definition of what is prohibited; after all, in Boyd v. French,229 that court stated that
"biblical quotations and references" are "undoubtedly ... improper, ' 230 and in
Bennett v. Angelone,"' that "federal and state courts have universally condemned
such religiously charged arguments as confusing, unnecessary, and
inflammatory.""23 The Fourth Circuit, however, did not reverse either Boyd or
Bennett, and in fact is notorious for its refusal to grant habeas relief in capital cases
229 147 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1998).
230 Id. at 328-29.
21, 92 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1996).
232 Id. at 1346.
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of any stripe.233 Without a mechanism for enforcement, however, even a clear rule
is worth very little.
a. Direct Review
Courts should adopt 95% of the Pennsylvania automatic reversal rule for
prosecutorial religious arguments in capital cases. There is a practical reason to do
so: the practice will stop. The Tennessee State Supreme Courts has expressed
frustration with the inadequacy of continued reprimands and warnings to counsel,
but in the face of this toothless disapproval, prosecutors have continued to quote the
Bible and urge its teachings, and trial courts have continued to permit the
arguments."' Motivated by the same frustration, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania adopted a rule that "reliance in any manner upon the Bible or any
other religious writing in support of the imposition of a penalty of death is
reversible error per se and may subject violators to disciplinary action."2" Since
establishing that rule, Pennsylvania has had to reverse only one criminal conviction
because a prosecutor made improper religious references during closing
argument.236
What is the 5% (or perhaps 2%) exception? Single, in passing, references to
"God" should not require reversal, in part because they probably cannot be deterred.
This is true whether the prosecutor says "my God!," refers to the victim as "a child
of God,"237 or says something incomprehensible that includes the word God, as he
did in one case, declaring the defendant's conviction was "as final in God as Ryan
Leahy [the victim]'s life is." '238 The Pennsylvania court somewhat cryptically-but
we think more or less correctly--captured the second reason to exempt such
remarks from the automatic reversal rule: "Appellant has failed to demonstrate how
the prosecutor's tangential reference to God constitutes an interjection of religious
233 See John H. Blume and Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Fourth Circuit's "Double-Edged
Sword:" Eviscerating the Right to Present Mitigating Evidence and Beheading the Right
to the Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REv. 1480 (1999).
234 See State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550, 559 (Tenn. 1999). The court stated:
We have condemned Biblical and scriptural references in a prosecutor's closing
argument so frequently that it is difficult not to conclude that the remarks in this
case were made either with blatant disregard for our decisions or a level of
astonishing ignorance of the state of the law in this regard.
Id.
23 Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (Pa. 1991).
236 See Commonwealth v. Brown, 711 A.2d 444, 457 (Pa. 1998) (reversing because of
prosecutor's reference to the biblical passage, "[w]hosoever shall offend one of these little
ones that believe in me, it is better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and
he were cast into the sea").
237 State v. Zuniga, 357 S.E.2d 898, 911 (N.C. 1987).
238 Commonwealth v. Smith, 675 A.2d 1221, 1232 (Pa. 1996).
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law for the jury's consideration."'239 That is to say, the likelihood of prejudice (or
endorsement of religion, for that matter) from such a scattered reference to God is
small.
The likelihood of prejudice inherent in most religious arguments, however,
provides a compelling doctrinal rationale for the 95% automatic reversal rule.
Under the harmless error doctrine, a defendant attacking a conviction based upon
constitutionally improper behavior by a prosecutor should have his conviction
reversed unless the state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional
violation did not affect the outcome. 24" But effects on the outcome of the
sentencing phase of a trial are far more difficult to assess than are effects on the
outcome of the guilt phase. There is no undeniably right answer to the sentencing
question, at least not in most cases in most jurisdictions. Thejury has vastly more
discretion in the sentencing phase than they do in the guilt phase, and how they
exercise it not only depends upon the particular evidence in front of them, but also
how they as individuals view that evidence and how they view the death penalty;
if this were not the case, capital cases would not require such elaborate and lengthy
jury selection procedures. An argument that tells jurors to look to religious law,
precepts, lessons, or the like, therefore carries with it an unquantifiable and highly
variable risk that any given juror's vote will be altered by his or her perceptions of
the commands of religious law. Moreover, whether the religious argument on its
face referred directly to a governing retributive rule or merely "resorted to Proverbs
for a more poetic version of a common-sense connection ... [between flight and
consciousness of guilt], '241 the fact that the representative of the "People of the
State of California" has made this argument implies that religious considerations are
appropriate in capital sentencing, thereby implicitly sanctioning the juror to think
for herself of an "eye for eye,' 242 even when the prosecutor has not said it.
Thus when the defendant objects and asks for a mistrial, reversal should be
automatic in all cases except those that contain only a random reference to God.
Moreover, as this rule becomes established, courts should be quick to find religious
argument by prosecutors to be plain error. In part, this is because the rule is clear
239 Id.
240 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1968). This is true for Establishment Clause
violations, Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause violations, and Freedom of Speech
violations. With respect to due process violations, the definition of the constitutional
violation itself requires the defendant to show that the misconduct "so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). Because all of the remarks that we would prohibit
on due process grounds also violate the Establishment Clause, the burden of proof of
harmlessness falls on the state for all prosecutorial religious arguments, as we have defined
them.
24' Bussard v. Lockhart, 32 F.3d 322, 324 (8th Cir. 1994).
242 Exodus 21:24 (King James).
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and easy for a prosecutor to avoid transgressing. There is an additional reason to
move such arguments to the plain error list: it is extremely difficult for defense
lawyers to object to such arguments without risking the impression that they, and
their clients, are opposed to the Bible, or even to God. To require a lawyer to
choose between asserting his client's rights and seeming to side with the Devil, or
at least with heretics, is another wrong of constitutional magnitude.
b. Collateral Review
The issue is different, however, on habeas corpus. Here we must part company
with the student author, who urges that the automatic reversal rule of the
Pennsylvania courts be applied to collateral as well as direct review. Whatever we
might wish the scope of habeas review to be, an automatic reversal rule is not
consistent with its present contours; section 2254(d) of the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) precludes application of such a rule in post-
AEDPA cases. In relevant part, AEDPA provides that an application for a writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state
court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in
a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.243
Thus, if a state court determines that a prosecutor's religious argument was proper,
a federal court must ask whether, at the time the state court ruled, clearly
established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, held
that such arguments violated a constitutional right.
We do not think it fairly can be said that the Supreme Court has clearly
established that all religious argument by prosecutors is prohibited. Both the
Caldwell rule, which prohibits comments that minimize thejury's responsibility for
the sentencing decision,2" and the Woodson rule, which requires individualized
sentencing determinations, 245 are, however, very clearly established, and with the
rare exception of a handful of very old cases, were clearly established at the time
the state court made its decision. Thus, arguments that violate Caldwell or
Woodson-those arguments that either supply a biblical rule of decision-making or
243 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. III 1997).
244 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
245 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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claim divine authorization for the state-are unconstitutional and a state court that
did not find them so was acting contrary to established Supreme Court authority.246
There may, however, be some additional cases in which habeas relief is
warranted. These are the cases in which the state court correctly determined that
a prosecutor's comment violated the Establishment Clause or the Due Process
Clause, but then incorrectly held that the error was harmless.247
C. Crafting More Modest Limits for Defense Attorneys
Our final section of this Article is, by necessity, about one part substance and
three parts imagination. True, there are few reported cases that involve precluded
religious arguments by defense lawyers. But for two reasons we think we need to
address the subject despite the lack of a live controversy at the moment. First, the
only court that has adopted a bright line automatic reversal rule for prosecutorial
religious arguments similar to the one we propose has held that the rule extends to
defense counsel;248 if more courts adopt a rule similar to the one we propose, we
anticipate pressure to extend the rule to defense counsel. The second reason is the
superficial attractiveness of an analogy to the reciprocal peremptory challenge rules
of Batson v. Kentucky249 and Georgia v. McCollum,250 an analogy we think is flawed
and would like to distinguish.
1. Constitutional Constraints that Limit Prosecutors' Religious Arguments Are
Inapplicable to Defense Counsel
Establishment Clause, Due Process Clause, and Freedom of Speech Clause
commands only apply to governmental actors. Prosecutors are indisputably
governmental actors whenever they act as prosecutors, but defense counsel, at least
during closing arguments, are not. In Georgia v. McCollum, the Supreme Court
extended the holding of Batson v. Kentucky to defense counsel, holding that the
Equal Protection Clause "prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in
246 As the Court recently has made clear, the test is not whether a renegade court in fact
ignored established authority, but whether the authority was clear. Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362 (2000).
247 On habeas corpus review, where the state court has found an error harmless, the
appropriate standard is whether the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 508 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (citing
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1945)).
248 See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 644 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1992); see also People v.
Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862,883 (Cal. 1992) (stating in dicta that constraints on defense counsel
are similar to those on prosecutors).
249 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
250 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
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purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory
challenges. 25' Whether McCollum is rightly decided,252 it does not control here.
Prior to McCollum, the Supreme Court held in Polk County v. Dodson,253 that
public defenders are not vested with state authority "when performing a lawyer's
traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. 254
McCollum does not purportto overrule Dodson but distinguishes it.2" The question
therefore, is not whether defense counsel is always or never a governmental actor,
but whether he takes on the mantle of the state in the exercise of a specific function.
The Court's analysis of why defense exercise of the peremptory challenge is
state action relies upon two factors that are not present when defense counsel
presents a closing argument. First, unlike when defense counsel is presenting a
closing argument, when he exercises a peremptory challenge, he "is performing a
traditional governmental function,' 256 because the selection of a jury in a criminal
case "fulfills a unique and constitutionally compelled governmental function. 257
Second, when defense counsel argues against the State in closing penalty phase
argument, it is clear to all observers that his actions are not those of the State, but
diametrically opposed to those of the State, in contrast to the appearance of state
involvement injury selection, where "[r]egardless of who precipitated the jurors'
removal, the perception and the reality in a criminal trial will be that the court has
excused the jurors based on race, an outcome that will be attributed to the State. 258
Thus, when defense counsel attempts to sway jurors away from imposing the death
sentence that is being sought by the State, he is not a governmental actor, and as
such, is not subject to First or Fourteenth Amendment constraints.259
Eighth Amendment prohibitions are likewise inapplicable to defense counsel.
It is the defendant, not the State, who has a right against the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment and therefore has the concomitant rights to heightened
2I Id. at 46.
252 See id. at 62-69 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the adversarial relationship
between the accused and the government precludes finding the accused a state actor); see
also Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory
Challenges, 35 WM. & MARYL. REV. 21 (1993) (arguing generally that McCollum is
wrongly decided because it exacerbates rather than ameliorates the effects of white racism).
253 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
254 Id. at 325.
25 McCollum, 112 U.S. at 42.
256 Id. at 51.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 53.
259 An additional reason supports the conclusion that there is no state action here:
McCollum and its precursor, Powers v. Ohio, 513 U.S. 951 (1994), which extended Batson
to civil cases, are themselves outliers on the state action doctrine continuum. See Burt
Newborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 419, 433
(1992).
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reliability and fairness in capital sentencing proceedings. Consequently, even if
defense counsels' religious remarks did diminish the jurors' sense of responsibility
for the imposition of a life sentence, or lead to less than individualized
determinations that a life sentence was appropriate, no constitutional violation
would have occurred.
2. Most Defense Religious Arguments Do Not Supplant State Law
When prosecutors argue "[h]e that smiteth a man ...shall ...be put to
death, '260 they contradict state law that requires individualized sentencing, thereby
violating the Eighth Amendment that requires individualized sentencing. As
discussed above, defense counsel's statements cannot analogously violate the
Eighth Amendment, but for non-constitutional reasons, a state court might want to
preclude counsel on either side from misstating the law. It is therefore worth noting
that defense religious arguments, unlike those most commonly made by prosecutors,
rarely offer an alternative rule of decision.
To take the most widely used example, the import of the story of the woman
caught in adultery is not either to forbid or prescribe a rule for capital punishment,
but to ask the sentencer to look at his or her own failings before making an ultimate
judgment. Similarly, the point of comparisons to David or Paul is not to supplant
state law, but to point out tojurors that even deeply flawed human beings, including
those who have committed murders can change and subsequently lead worthwhile
lives. Thus, we think the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was wrong to deem any
defense comment on religion (except those limited to "consideration of the
character and record of the accused") an attack on the legislative enactment of the
death penalty.261 Such a sweeping condemnation sounds a little paranoid.
This is not to say that defense arguments never offer a substitute rule of
decision. If defense counsel says "The Bible says 'Thou shalt not kill,' and there's
no exception for killings by the State of Arizona," counsel has argued for
supplanting state law with religious law. If defense counsel says "Pope John Paul
II has said that the death penalty is wrong and no good Catholic can vote for the
death penalty," counsel has again argued for replacing state law with religious
authority. Notice, however, that chopping off the second half of each of those
sentences makes them more ambiguous; if the lawyer only says "The Bible says
'Thou shalt not kill," or "Pope John Paul II and other religious leaders have
concluded that the death penalty is wrong," it is less clear whether this is an
argument to supplant state law or a moral argument for extreme caution in imposing
the death penalty. Given the ambiguity, courts should consider the affirmative
260 Exodus 21:12 (King James).
261 Commonwealth v. Daniels, 644 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Pa. 1992).
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reasons for permitting such an argument, discussed in Part III C (4) below, before
deciding to preclude it.
3. Most Defense Religious Arguments Are Not Inflammatory
Just as defense argument supplanting state law may be a legitimate judicial
concern even though it has no constitutional dimension, inflammatory defense
arguments are a source of legitimate concern even when they come from defense
counsel and therefore do not violate the Due Process Clause. The overwhelming
majority of defense religious arguments, however, have no inflammatory potential.
The only exception we have found in the reported cases is the defense attorney who
argued that the death penalty is un-Christian and that if the jurors impose it, they
will suffer after death.262 This is more than inflammatory; it is threatening, and
should not be permitted.
4. Affirmative Reasons to Allow Defense Religious Arguments Should Be
Considered
A final justification for imposing only modest limitations on defense counsel's
use of religious arguments lies in the affirmative benefits of such arguments.
Briefly, we think-there are three reasons for viewing defense resort to religious
arguments with a generous eye, all three of which relate to the ways in which "death
is a different kind of punishment from any other," '263 and consequently, requires a
"greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination." 2"
a. Encouragement of Individual Jurors' Responsibility for Sentencing
As discussed above, in Caldwell v. Mississippi,26 the Supreme Court held that
it is "constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination
made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for
determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere." '266 While
many, if not most, prosecutorial references to religion during closing argument tend
to diminish thejury's sense of responsibility (because they suggest that the decision
is dictated by the Bible or God), most defense arguments emphasize and encourage
individual responsibility for the life or death decision. In part, this is the flip side
262 See McNair v. State, 653 So. 2d 320 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
263 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
357-58 (1977)).
264 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983).
265 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
266 Id. at 328-29. •
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of not advocating a retributive rule for decision-making, but instead encouraging
personal reflection.
b. Facilitating the Consideration ofAll Relevant Mitigating Circumstances
Even more significantly, allowing a fairly free rein for defense penalty phase
summations comports with the "rejection of the common-law practice of inexorably
imposing a death sentence upon every person convicted of a specified offense," '267
and the required "particularized consideration of ... the character and record of
each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death."26
This need for truly individualized decision-making has led to very broad
admissibility rules for the mitigation evidence in capital sentencing proceedings.269
Mitigating evidence is evidence which "in fairness and mercy, may be considered
as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability." 7 °
As the Supreme Court's mitigation decisions have unfolded, they have stressed
that the sentencing body's possession of the fullest information possible concerning
the defendant's life and characteristics is highly relevant, if not essential, to the
selection of the appropriate sentence. The sentencer, in all but that rarest kind of
capital case, must be allowed to consider, "as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."27 ' The Court has
employed this requirement of individualized sentencing to strike down death
sentences where the jury was precluded from considering the defendant's age or
relatively minor role in the offense,272 evidence of "a turbulent family history, of
beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional disturbance," '73 evidence that
as a child the defendant had habitually inhaled gasoline, that after on one occasion
passing out from the fumes, his mind tended to wander, that he had been one of
seven children in a poor family forced to pick cotton, that his father had died of
cancer, and that he had been a loving uncle,274 and evidence of mental retardation.275
Moreover, even mitigation evidence that does not relate to culpability for the
charged crime must be admitted under the Lockett principle so long as it may serve
267 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976).
268 Id. at 303.
269 See Green v. Georgia, 520 U.S. 1125 (1997) (state hearsay rules must yield to right
to present mitigation evidence).
270 BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 903 (5th ed. 1979).
27' Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
272 See id. at 608.
273 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
274 Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
275 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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as a "basis for a sentence less than death. '2 76
Though the Court has been adamant that it is essential that the sentencer
consider those "compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
fiailties of humankind, 277 and has defined those factors broadly, the defendant's
right to have relevant mitigating evidence actually considered by the jury depends
both upon what evidence the state must allow the defendant to present, and upon
what, and how persuasively, defense counsel may marshal that evidence. Allowing
defense counsel to employ religious references may enhance his or her ability to
showjurors the significance of the "compassionate or mitigating factors stemming
from the diverse frailties of humankind.27 8
c. Counteracting Prevalent Cultural "Eye for Eye" Religious Orientations
A final reason to allow defense counsel wide latitude in the use of religious
arguments is the cultural prevalence of "an eye for an eye" religious orientations.
Although jurors who would automatically impose the death penalty in every case
should be eliminated by voir dire, data from the Capital Jury Project shows that
many suchj urors survive the death qualification process.279 Particularly when some
of the jurors come into the jury with a mandatory death penalty predisposition that
was created by prior exposure to retributive religious doctrines, the best way to
combat that (unconstitutional) predisposition is likely to be through reference to
countervailing religious principles and stories. At the very least, in order to create
any receptivity to mitigating evidence, defense lawyers may need to first defuse
beliefs that God commands every murderer be put to death.
5. Balancing Legitimate Judicial Concerns with the Defendant's Interest in
Effective Advocacy
Because the constitutional constraints that curtail prosecutors' religious
arguments in capital cases do not speak to defense religious summation, because
garden-variety defense arguments differ in kind from common prosecutorial
276 In Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), the Court held that exclusion from
the sentencing hearing of proffered testimony regarding the defendant's good behavior
during pretrial incarceration violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; in Simmons
v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), it went one step further and held that the
defendant's statutory ineligibility for parole, at least in a case where future dangerousness
was an issue, might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death and therefore must be
presented to the jury upon the defendant's request.
277 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
278 See id
279 See, e.g., William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and
Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1087-90 (1995).
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religious arguments, and because there are significant constitutional values
furthered by allowing defense counsel substantial leeway in their employment of
religious imagery and allusions, the rules forbidding religious argument should not
be applied to defense attorneys. Instead, defense attorneys' arguments should be
precluded only when they clearly infringe upon another judicial value.
Courts therefore may legitimately restrain religious arguments by defense
counsel when those arguments: (1) directly advocate replacing state law with
religious law or bowing to religious authority; (2) threaten the jury with divine
wrath or are in some other way inflammatory; (3) denigrate the significance of
killing the victim based upon the victim's'religious beliefs; or (4) opt for generic
recitation of religious platitudes when such recitations reveal a lack of diligent
investigation and advocacy of mitigation evidence in violation of the duty to
provide effective assistance of counsel. Otherwise, religious argument by defense
counsel should not be restrained.
CONCLUSION
These are our "closing remarks" and we are both defense counsel, so we should
not be precluded from resorting to religious argument. What is sauce for the goose
is not always sauce for the gander:
And behold, there was a man with a withered hand. And they asked him,
"Is it lawful to heal on the sabbath?" so that they might accuse him. He
said to them, "What man of you, if he has one sheep and it falls into a pit
on the sabbath, will not lay hold of it and lift it out? Of how much more
value is a man than a sheep! So it is lawful to do good on the sabbath.
The he said to the man, "Stretch out your hand." And the man stretched
it out, and it was restored, whole like the other.28
The Sabbath should be honored, and the law should be honored, but it is lawful to
do good on the Sabbath. The Establishment Clause, the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Freedom of Speech Clause all
must be honored, but defense religious appealsfor life do not dishonor any of these
principles. -
To quote a secular authority, for a prosecutor to make the sentencing task easier
"by implying that God is on the side of a death sentence is an intolerable self-
serving perversion of Christian faith as well as the criminal law. . .""' To imply
that God is on the side of a life sentence is another matter; whether correct or not,
such an argument dishonors neither the law nor the Sabbath.
280 Matthew 12:10-13 (Revised Standard Version) (emphasis added).
281 Long v. State, 883 P.2d 167, 177 (Okla. 1994).
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